<h3 dir="ltr">Introduction</h3>
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has the second-highest concentration of internally displaced persons (IDPs). This amounts to 23%&nbsp; globally, with 16.2 million people currently displaced within their country. Yemen and Syria were the two countries in the MENA with the most IDPs by the end of 2023 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2024). Both have been experiencing an ongoing convergence of climate change and conflicts, complexifying the identification of intertwined root causes of displacement.&nbsp;
Syria and Yemen have had the most IDPs due to conflicts over the years, while climate is a new prevalent driver of displacement. The livelihoods of climate-displaced populations, or those at risk, are particularly at stake during related hazardous events and in the long term. Climate change is particularly threatening to the self-reliance (1) of vulnerable IDPs in rural areas, reducing their options for durable solutions (2). It exacerbates rural-to-urban displacement, resulting in a mismatch of labor-market skills and drastically impacting food security.&nbsp;
Climate change has undoubtedly exacerbated the already dire situation of internal displacement in both Syria and Yemen. The MENA is, after all, &ldquo;one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, enduring extremely high temperatures, desertification, water scarcity, degraded marine and coastal ecosystems and high levels of air pollution&rdquo; (World Bank, 2022, para.1). While acknowledging the numerous aspects of displacement, this article focuses only on climate change as it links to the livelihood and food security of displaced populations or at risk of displacement.&nbsp;&nbsp;
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Climate displacement in Syria and Yemen</h3>
The Global Report on Internal Displacement (2024) shows that &ldquo;all but three of the 45 countries and territories that reported conflict displacement last year also reported disaster displacement&rdquo; (p.13). The convergence of disasters and conflicts is incontestable, and if the root causes are at times unclear, climate change can be considered a &ldquo;threat multiplier&rdquo; (Mixed Migration Center, 2024). Since displacement lasts for an extended period, exposure to climate disasters will likely result in subsequent displacements. Internally displaced Syrians, for instance, have been displaced around three times for an average of five years (Danish Refugee Council, 2024).
Yemen, which has been at war since 2014, has, for instance, witnessed three times more climate-induced displacement in 2023 than conflict-driven, with 240,000 and 80,000 IDPs, respectively (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2024). The floods in Yemen, which constitute the prominent climate hazard people are exposed to, have displaced 174,000 persons in 2023 alone. Ten years before, in 2013, floods had displaced 10,000 persons, illustrating the uptick in displacement due to climate events. This is corroborated by the fact that from January 2024 to May 2024, the most significant displacement events (above 1,000 persons) were climate-induced. Conflict-induced displacements have impacted only hundreds of people per displacement event; however, with a higher frequency. Notably, the average number of times Yemenis have been displaced is 1.3 times, with 20.6% of IDPs displaced between two to seven times (Cash Consortium of Yemen, 2024) (3).
In Syria, 83% of the respondents of a recent multi-sector needs assessment (of which the Danish Refugee Council was a part) said they were displaced. Around 48% declared they were planning to leave their current area due to inadequate housing (the main reason), and 17% due to the lack of livelihood (the second) (Danish Refugee Council, 2024). Interestingly, none of the surveyed persons mentioned climate risks as a direct driver of displacement but rather the consequence of it, particularly as it impacts livelihoods. Syria is highly exposed to drought risks, almost twice as much as the global average (Economist Impact, n.d.). This calamity only reinforces the disastrous consequences on livelihoods and displacements. Humanitarian field teams also report the occurrence of displacement due to drought, water stress, and increased social tensions due to the competition over natural resources (4).
In Yemen, climate-induced displacement surpassed those caused by conflicts in 2023. The population faced climate hazards, including forest fires, cyclones, floods, and droughts. For instance, between the 17th and 22nd of April 2024, a total of 2,875 persons in IDP camps were displaced across several governorates in Yemen due to floods (SEE News, 2024).
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Impacts of climate change on food security and livelihood&nbsp;</h3>
As the latest flood events in Yemen highlighted, persons who are already displaced are the most at risk of climate hazards and secondary displacement. The immediate general impact faced by the IDPs includes the destruction of physical assets (housing and productive infrastructure), the death or injuries of persons, the impeded access and disruption of the supply chain and aid, as well as the potential loss of documentation, among others. Displacement also causes psychological trauma and stress that can hinder the ability of IDPs to restart their livelihoods.&nbsp;
Much longer-lasting impacts of climate change on already displaced populations are the social tensions between IDPs and host communities over vital resources like water and land. It also heightens risks for populations in their efforts to sustain themselves. For instance, women and children in Yemen must walk multitudinous hours daily to fetch water or firewood. This carries safety risks, including gender-based violence, but also the inability to access education or to attend to livelihoods, thus limiting opportunities for children and women to realize their potential.&nbsp;
The main climate risks (5) Yemen and Syria witnessed are the impacts on agriculture livelihood and food insecurity. Across the Middle East, agriculture is the most critical sector in Yemen and Syria. It accounts for 28.7% and 27.8%, respectively, of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 29% and 15% of their workforce employment (Mixed Migration Center, 2024). Climate change is putting immense pressure on the population that relies solely on agriculture for their livelihood at a time when only 38% of IDP households can earn an income compared to 67% of host communities (Cash Consortium of Yemen, 2024).&nbsp;
Climate change impacts the livelihoods of vulnerable populations disproportionately. Smallholder farmers represent 85% of the farming force in the region (UNESCWA, 2023) and are particularly vulnerable as they rely on climate-sensitive natural resources. According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), &ldquo;[s]mall-scale farming is the main source of food production in the Arab region; hence, climate change will have implications for wider food security&rdquo;(UNESCWA, 2023, p.12).&nbsp;
The prevalence of severe food insecurity is also the highest in Yemen and Syria compared to the rest of the MENA countries (6). In 2023, the World Bank&rsquo;s &ldquo;World Food Security Outlook&rdquo; estimated that severe food insecurity had affected 88.9% of the population in Yemen and 41.7% in Syria (World Bank, 2023), forecasting a slight incremental increase in these percentages until 2028. This dire reality illustrates the critical food security challenges, foreseeing worsening scenarios. Regarding food availability, Syria and Yemen are the countries with the lowest rates of food availability globally (Economist Impact, n.d.). Given how Syria and Yemen rely heavily on the agricultural sector, these food insecurity scores illustrate the harm caused by conflict and climate on production and market functionality.
Reduced agriculture production ultimately leads to food scarcity and price hikes, directly impacting the most vulnerable groups, increasing poverty, and pushing displacement further. The breakdown of agricultural livelihoods also forces many to leave their homes in search of better opportunities. UNESCWA evidences the link between the &ldquo;accelerated warming of the Arab region&rdquo; and the &ldquo;rural-to-urban migration&rdquo; (UNESCWA, 2023). The United Nations Secretary-General&rsquo;s High-Level Panel of Internal Displacement recognized that &ldquo;a significant aspect of this challenge is the rural-to-urban migration that has been on the rise due to climate factors.&rdquo; IDPs who move to urban areas can no longer cultivate their lands, and their farming skills do not match those needed in the labor market of Yemeni and Syrian cities, where unemployment is already high.
<h3 dir="ltr">Supporting climate change-impacted livelihoods&nbsp;</h3>
Addressing climate change as a root cause of internal displacement is crucial for preventing new and secondary displacements, supporting livelihoods, and strengthening food security in Yemen and Syria. It requires supporting IDPs or host communities at risk of climate-induced displacement in rural areas to diversify their means of livelihood and adapt to global warming using climate-smart agriculture, improved post-harvest handling techniques, the introduction of local and resilient seeds, improved local water and natural resource management systems at the community level. Humanitarian and development actors, government, and other relevant stakeholders must take anticipatory actions to ensure preparedness for natural disasters. They must provide appropriate financial support for these efforts, improve access to green energy (solar or biogas), and ensure that the affected population can access food and basic needs during climate shocks through relevant social protection schemes.&nbsp;
As for the population that has already been displaced or is at risk of moving from rural to urban areas, local authorities need to integrate them into their new locations&rsquo; ecosystem and labor market. They can create and strengthen labor mobility pathways that give access to green, alternative, and sustainable work opportunities (7) for populations impacted by climate change (UNESCWA, 2023).&nbsp;
<hr>
(1) Self-reliance refers to the social and economic ability of an individual, household or community to meet its essential needs in a sustainable manner.
(2) As per the United Nations definition, durable solutions for IDPs encompass either the sustainable reintegration in their place of origin (return), the sustainable local integration in the places where IDPs take refuge (local integration), or the sustainable integration in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere).
(3) It is however important to note that the database from the DRC-led Cash Consortium of Yemen, did not allow the disaggregation of displacement between conflict- or climate-induced displacements. 
(4) It remains anecdotal in the absence of sufficient data and monitoring on climate-induced displacement within government-controlled areas in Syria.
(5) Climate risk is here considered as a function of hazards, exposure and vulnerability.
(6) This is understood as the definition of the MENA region as per the World Bank. The data might not reflect the up-to-date food insecurity in Gaza.&nbsp;
(7) The International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines decent work as that which is &ldquo;productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for all, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men&rdquo;.
<hr>
References
<ul>
<li dir="ltr">Cash Consortium of Yemen. (2024). Vulnerability Analysis Framework, data from February to May 2024.</li>
<li dir="ltr">Danish Refugee Council. (2024, April). Multi-sector needs assessment in Syria.</li>
<li dir="ltr">Economist Impact. (2022). Food security index: Explore countries - Syria. Retrieved from <a href="https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/explore-countries/syria">https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/explore-countries/syria</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">Economist Impact. (2022). Food security index: Explore countries - Yemen. Retrieved from <a href="https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/explore-countries/yemen">https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/explore-countries/yemen</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. (2024). Global report on internal displacement 2024. Retrieved from <a href="https://api.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/IDMC-GRID-2024-Global-Report-on-Internal-Displacement.pdf">https://api.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/IDMC-GRID-2024-Global-Report-on-Internal-Displacement.pdf</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. (2024). Country profiles &ndash; Yemen. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/yemen/">https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/yemen/</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. (2024). Country profiles &ndash; Syria. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria/">https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria/</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">Mixed Migration Center. (2024, April). Climate change impacts and mobility in the Middle East. Retrieved from <a href="https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/326_Climate-Change-Middle-East.pdf">https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/326_Climate-Change-Middle-East.pdf</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">SEE News. (2023). 21000 Yemeni displaced affected by floods. Retrieved from <a href="https://see.news/21000-yemeni-displaced-affected-by-floods">https://see.news/21000-yemeni-displaced-affected-by-floods</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. (2023). Migration and climate change in the Arab region: Policy brief. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pdf/migration_and_climate_change_in_the_arab_region-policy_brief-eng_0.pdf">https://www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/pubs/pdf/migration_and_climate_change_in_the_arab_region-policy_brief-eng_0.pdf</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">World Bank. (2022). Middle East &amp; North Africa climate roadmap (2021-2025). Retrieved from <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/middle-east-north-africa-climate-roadmap">https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/middle-east-north-africa-climate-roadmap</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">World Bank. (2024). Survey on impact of climate change on households. Retrieved from <a href="https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6103">https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6103</a></li>
</ul>

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