<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Introduction</h3>
After about a decade of military operations led by opposition factions, primarily Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the fall of the Syrian regime opened a serious opportunity for a genuine political transition. It is considered the first of its kind in Syria in over fifty years. However, this sudden collapse of Assad's regime has also led to incurring challenges in the political transition process on participatory basis amongst Syrian parties as outlined in Resolution 2254. Issued in December 2015, this resolution identified the reconcilable warring parties as the regime and the opposition while it excluded other groups such as ISIS and HTS from the negotiations. The settlement process was supposed to be under UN sponsorship, primarily dominated by the will of Western countries allied with the Syrian opposition, it was also agreed upon by Russia, which supports Assad's regime.&nbsp;
However, the recent military developments have effectively sidelined the Syrian regime from the equation, removing its participation in the new power-sharing arrangement. Meanwhile, HTS, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, has emerged as a significant political player, leading military operations alongside Turkish-backed armed opposition group. Thus, excluding HTS from the "post-Assad" arrangements has become impossible, as its leader, Ahmad al-Shar'a (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani), is now the de facto ruler of Syria. While it is crucial to keep ISIS excluded and to combat its terrorist activities, integrating HTS into the political transition is essential for ensuring its serious participation in the future of Syria, preventing it from obstructing Syrian stability in the future.
Thus, this commentary reviews the major advantages of relying on Resolution 2254 as a reference for the political transition in Syria. In addition, it highlights the gaps that should be addressed in future Security Council resolutions.
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Resolution 2254: a UN reference not devoid of gaps&nbsp;</h3>
Resolution 2254 was issued in December 2015 following Aleppo battles that led to the opposition's withdrawal from the city and the evacuation of all fighters to northern countryside of Aleppo and Idlib. These withdrawals marked the beginning of Turkish-Russian-Iranian understandings that later established de-escalation agreements in Astana in the following years, enabling Assad to regain control over some previously lost areas. Thus, this resolution reflected a military balance that is now very different from the current situation. It allowed for power sharing between the regime and the opposition while it excluded both ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra at that time (now known as HTS) (UN security council, 2015).
The UN resolution calls for a ceasefire among the warring parties in Syria, urging the release of detainees and the delivery of humanitarian aid to besieged areas. It also calls for all-inclusive non-sectarian political process&mdash;under UN supervision&mdash;for about six months to establish a timeline for the political transition. This process is expected to lead to the drafting of a new constitution and the organization of free and fair elections, ensuring the participation of all Syrians, particularly those abroad, within 18 months. A transitional governing body, formed on a participatory basis, is intended to ensure ongoing confidence-building measures and oversee the transition process until comprehensive elections are held.
It is beneficial to continue relying on Resolution 2254 despite the political context change, as it acknowledges the UN's role in the political transition process, ensuring that no component of the Syrian populace is excluded and that sectarianism does not dominate the transition phases. Additionally, the resolution clearly outlines the three pillars of the political transition: the formation of a non-sectarian, participatory government within six months, drafting a new constitution, and conducting free and fair elections within 18 months. Regional and international powers are allowed to negotiate with the new authorities in Damascus to commit to all Syrians inclusiveness and to execute the three pillars of the transition in exchange for international support that is necessary for commencing the political transition and reconstruction. This could reduce the likelihood of the new authority deviation from a democratic path or allowing its ideological stance to dominate the transition.
Nevertheless, the resolution conflicts with reality by designating HTS as a terrorist organization that must be countered, even though it currently holds power in Syria. Moreover, it overlooks the significant ideological and political transformations occurred since 2017 concerning HTS's political program, operational tools, interim targets and leadership structure. Recent statements of its leader Ahmad al-Shar'a/ Abu Muhammad al-Jolani reflect acceptance of Syria as a final homeland within its current borders, engaging in the political transition with a focus on civil law, constitution, free elections, and abandoning extremist violent approaches towards minorities or politically differing factions. This could pave the way for a new phase of engaging with HTS as a political faction in the political process.
The extent of positive international engagement with HTS will depend on the conviction of international powers and Syrian opposition factions regarding these transformations. This is in addition to trust of the definitiveness of these transformations as not being subject to reversal or denial should future elections exclude them from power. Nonetheless, it is crucial, in a phased manner, to establish necessary guarantees in forming the transitional governing body and setting a timeline for drafting a constitution and conducting elections. This is to ensure that HTS will not dominate with its Islamic reference the new state's foundations, which should be religiously neutral and inclusive of all Syrians. Currently, an HTS- formed government is temporarily managing affairs for three months, which appears to be a preliminary training period for its members to assume state functions across Syria, following years of governance in Idlib. However, if they continue to monopolize government positions without forming a participatory government after the three-month period, it could undermine the credibility of the new Syrian administration and limit trust in the political transition process.
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">The challenge of armed chaos and military control over political decisions</h3>
On another front, Resolution 2254 did not adequately address how to control the chaos of arms in Syria. Its references were limited to calling for a ceasefire, releasing detainees, and delivering humanitarian aid, without laying the groundwork for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Therefore, any new UN resolution must address this issue by emphasizing the importance of consolidating arms within state control and outlining steps for disarming militias and reintegrating those suitable into the new security and military apparatus. This is added to preparing a plan for civil reintegration for those unsuitable to ensure they do not obstruct peace efforts.
It is essential to recognize that the DDR process is closely linked to transitional justice. It is unreasonable to rely on military or security personnel who have previously participated in war crimes or human rights violations. Hence, preconditions for settling situations or DDR must include that the individuals involved have not engaged in any crimes. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic has documented about 4,000 names involved in crimes against humanity during the revolution and war in Syria, necessitating their disarmament and bringing to justice (Al-Arabiya, 2024).
Meanwhile, the Syrian Network for Human Rights has recorded, based on victim testimonies, approximately 16,200 names of those who committed crimes against the Syrian people over 14 years, including around 6,000 from regular forces and the rest from affiliated militias (Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2024). This also necessitates their disarmament and accountability, in addition to neutralizing them from the military and security landscape to prevent them from becoming destabilizing actors in the new regime or becoming involved in organized crime networks.
The transitional government led by Muhammad al-Bashir has opened centers to address the situations of officers and personnel in the previous regime's security and military apparatus. The centers have already received weapons from hundreds and issued them confirmation cards. However, similar procedures for the opposition armed groups have yet to be accurately announced.
Conversely, Ahmad al-Shar'a&mdash;despite or perhaps because of his jihadist past experience with al-Qaeda&mdash;emerges as one of the key figures capable of ensuring compliance among most opposition fighters to integrate into the new security and military apparatus. He possesses a clear "charisma" among fighters, whether they are opposition members or even jihadists aligned with al-Qaeda. Throughout his various ideological transformations, he has been able to reach temporary agreements with them over years, leading to the emergence of the recent military alliance that toppled Assad.
Opposition armed factions have often accepted al-Jolani/al-Shar'a monopolization of a larger share of military spoils after each battle due to the strength and valor of his fighters and their significant role in achieving military victories. Thus, it appears that HTS's monopoly of prominent positions in the transitional government aligns with the principle of spoils sharing that governed military operations in the past. However, managing civilian governance in the post-Assad phase differs significantly from the military logic that aimed to overthrow him. The fait accompli necessitates that al-Shar'a remains involved in the transitional phase to ensure compliance of the armed opposition fighters without HTS full control over the political transition process. This underscores the importance of conditional international and regional acceptance of the political transition steps in the new Syria.
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">International and regional acceptance for the new administration</h3>
Post-Assad's fall days, international and regional diplomatic visits to Damascus resumed after years of isolation imposed after the revolution. Key delegations included the Turkish foreign minister and, before him, the head of Turkish intelligence, alongside diplomatic missions from France, Britain, Germany, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The Jordanian foreign minister and the Qatari state minister for foreign affairs also visited Damascus, alongside a central visit from the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, to discuss political transition steps. The surge in diplomatic visits and communications with the new authority in Syria indicates that the reassurances sent to minorities and neighboring countries by the new administration in Damascus are yielding initial support.
As a consequence, initial steps to integrate this authority into the international and Arab spheres have been achieved, but still remains testing the sincerity of these reassurances as the political transition unfolds and competition intensifies among various Syrian actors, whether military or political. Generally, garnering initial international and regional acceptance of the political transition in Syria means that these powers&mdash;who have been reopening their embassies in Damascus&mdash;will act as active players and direct guarantors of the Syrian transition process to be all inclusive.
This requires that the subsequent steps for the political transition to be discussed through direct coordination between the new Syrian administration and the UN Special Envoy for Syria. This is to lead to drafting a precise roadmap for the political process that includes an inclusive national dialogue, a participatory government, and arrangements for drafting the constitution and elections. Supposedly, this roadmap should be formalized in a new binding international resolution from the Security Council to ensure the implementation of the transition steps under international guarantee. Unlike the stagnation that has affected the Security Council regarding Syria for years, it is expected that Moscow and Washington will coordinate on the new resolution to bolster the emerging Syrian stability with a binding timeline for the political transition.
Tehran, on the other hand, may seek to obstruct the political transition as a form of retaliation for its loss of territory that was once almost secured in Syria for its influence. Potentially, it will attempt to create loyal enclaves or to stir some chaos that would allow it to reinsert itself later. Similarly, Tel Aviv may aim to instigate similar chaos to maintain its forces' expansion into Syrian territories, deepening its presence beyond six km from the 1974 disengagement line. However, these attempts to incite chaos will likely fail, as the involved or sponsoring actors have clear hostilities, specifically Iran and Israel, making cooperation between them excluded in this context.
Conversely, Ankara has a direct interest in ensuring a successful Syrian transition in a context of security stability, yet it may pursue rapid military escalation against the Kurds&rsquo; Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast. This is in order for the new administration to complete its control over the entire Syrian map and to eliminate any remnants of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Syria. However, if this military operation prolongs or the SDF shows notable resistance, a new wave of casualties and civilian displacement may arise. At the same time, Turkey has a direct interest in collaborating with the Arab world to support the Syrian transition in a stable environment, attempting to establish a Sunni vertical axis linking it with the Arab Gulf through Syria and Jordan, countering the horizontal Shiite axis connecting Iran with Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. As well, Ankara has a direct interest in coordinating American cooperation with the new authority in Damascus that could convince Trump and his administration of its effectiveness in combating ISIS instead of the Kurdish SDF forces.
The Arab region has taken some time to absorb the shock of a "former jihadist/terrorist" rapidly ascending to power without significant bloodshed in one of the most prominent Arab countries. The offset of the Assad&rsquo;s regime proved to be another unexpected shock that preceded typical regional arrangements, making it seem as if Arab states were racing to keep pace with the Syrian developments rather than orchestrating behind the scenes. Therefore, it is beneficial to rapidly understand the Syrian developments and to prepare for more by effectively investing in establishing stability in Syria. In addition, it is important to reach an Arab consensus with the new Syrian administration on a set of principles that ensure regional security and prevent Syria from becoming an open arena for threatening the region's safety again. Among these principles is ensuring border security with neighboring Arab countries, which would end drug trafficking routes and prevent the flow of weapons and fighters from Syria to other parts of the region. It is also essential to prevent the concentration of malicious networks regarding global "jihadist" agendas in Syria, which should be accompanied by efforts to combat any potential resurgence of ISIS, both within Syria or from its territories to neighboring Arab countries.
Moreover, ensuring the inclusion of all Syrians in the political transition phase and preventing the marginalization of minorities or different sects is crucial for creating a secure environment for the transition. This should also pave the way for the restoration of expropriated properties, and reconstruction of infrastructure and houses, to guarantee the safe and voluntary return of Syrian refugees abroad. Finally, revitalizing the economy and creating new investment opportunities are keys to sustaining and stability of this return. The returnees will be quickly reintegrated into the free market that the new administration has promised to launch in Syria. Arab countries could undoubtedly play a pivotal role in swiftly establishing stability in Syria, provided that financial resources and investments flow quickly into infrastructure to revitalize the economy, provide essential services, and restore housing. This will lead to reassuring and encouraging refugees abroad and internally displaced people in the north to return home to participate in the political transition and the reconstruction phase.
<hr>
Refrences&nbsp;
Arabic References
<ul dir="rtl">
<li>مجلس الأمن. (18 ديسمبر، 2015). نص القرار 2254 <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2254/">http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2254/</a> </li>
<li>موقع العربية. (12 ديسمبر، 2012). "محققون أمميون قوائم سرية بـ 4000 من مرتكبي الجرائم الخطيرة في سوريا". <a href="https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/syria/2024/12/12/%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%80-4000-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A-">t.ly/Z8Zto</a></li>
<li>الشبكة السورية لحقوق الإنسان. (23 ديسمبر، 2024). "لا بديل عن محاسبة مرتكبي الجرائم ضد الإنسانية وجرائم الحرب". <a href="https://snhr.org/arabic/2024/12/23/%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5/">t.ly/FMBfl</a></li>
</ul>

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