In February 2020, Egypt triumphantly declared that its population had reached the landmark of 100 million. After decades of interest in Egypt&rsquo;s population problem, I was dismayed, but not surprised, by the celebratory spirit of the announcement. When the results of the 2017 population census were announced, the big&mdash;and happy&mdash;news was that we had already passed the 100 million mark, if Egyptians abroad were counted. The fact that expatriate Egyptians are not covered by the census and that the official census count was less than 95 million did not appear to be relevant. Why does a country like Egypt, which has long named high population growth as a top challenge, appear only too happy to have a large population? The answer is simple: there is strength in numbers. Population size is correlated with political power. To understand how broadly accepted this association is, try invoking China in a conversation with educated people. Sure enough, at least one person will cite its success as proof that a large population is a blessing, not a problem.&nbsp;&nbsp;
So where is the error? It is that the issue is not population size&nbsp;per se&nbsp;but population growth. They are related, of course, but remain distinct. Those who use China as an example to dismiss Egypt&rsquo;s population problem conveniently forget that China imposed an outrageous one-child policy to drastically curb population growth long before ultimately attaining its current high position on the world&rsquo;s political and economic ladder. In other words, by focusing on size and ignoring growth, they are learning the wrong lesson. In any case, in terms of combating population growth, China is not a good example to emulate. Not only was its population policy unacceptably coercive, it also had several adverse implications such as rapid population ageing and unbalanced sex ratios (Basten &amp; Jiang, 2014). Lessons from successful population policies, however, can be found in several Asian and African countries, including Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Iran, and Rwanda. What are these lessons?
<h3>Lessons from successful family planning programs</h3>
The second half of the 20th century, especially the 1960s and 70s, witnessed unprecedented high population growth in developing countries, alarmingly threatening their development plans. In response, several countries established government-funded family planning programs that focused on subsidized services, usually coupled with promotional campaigns to increase demand for family planning. In contrast to the public-sector based campaigns administered by Egypt and India, family planning programs in Thailand, Malaysia, and Bangladesh adopted multi-provider, decentralized models that focused on overcoming social barriers especially in poor and marginalized areas (Aspalter, 2002; Day, 1982; Fong, 1982; Rob et al., 2004). Multi-provider models, where services are equally provided by the public, private, and civil sectors, accord people agency and choice. Before the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), individual choice was not a typical element of population programs, but it was a common factor of successful programs.
Cairo ICPD marked a shift of the family planning paradigm away from demographic targets toward reproductive rights (May 2012). By the turn of the new millennium, discussing family planning policies as options for curtailing population growth had become almost offensive. Several large Asian countries with notably successful family planning programs, such as Bangladesh, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam, currently have fertility levels at or below replacement levels. Current population policies in most of these countries mainly address ageing. Some even encourage higher fertility. The bulk of the global population increase has shifted to Africa. The United Nations (2019) estimates that nine countries, five of them in Africa, will account for half the global population increase from 2019 to 2050. With an eye on Africa, policy-advising researchers are starting to tread lightly back into the pre-Cairo ICPD demographic discourse where female education and women&rsquo;s empowerment are cited not as goals but rather as levers to help control high fertility (e.g., May &amp; Rotenberg, 2020). Unfortunately, this ignores that what has worked best is putting individual choice and well-being at the core of policy rather than the periphery.&nbsp;
The success of two recent family planning programs is especially worth highlighting. Iran&rsquo;s program is occasionally cited to discredit the theory that adopting a Western modernization model is a precondition for the transition from high to low fertility. The success of Iran&rsquo;s policy is usually attributed to strong political will and the positive involvement of religious leaders. The main factors that underlie the program&rsquo;s success, however, are respect for individual choice, investment in education, and the adoption of a democratic and inclusive approach to the program&rsquo;s design and implementation (Hoodfar &amp; Assadpour, 2000). The second successful program comes from Rwanda, a poor sub-Saharan country that experienced genocide and devastating civil unrest in 1994. Typical for pro-natalist sub-Saharan Africa, the challenge of the Rwandan family planning program was to create demand. The answer to that problem was found in packaging the program not as a method of fertility control but rather as a means to decrease maternal and infant mortality rates. With a stated aim of empowering people, the program provided a wide choice of contraceptive methods (Lantos, 2019). Choice, in every case, is found at the core of successful family planning programs.&nbsp;
<h3>Going beyond family planning</h3>
Family planning programs are not necessarily the key element in successful fertility control. In East and Southeast Asia, investing in education and human capital was both a driver of the fertility transition and an enabler of the economic demographic dividend that resulted from that transition (Mason, 2001). Rwanda&rsquo;s successful family planning program is one of several social policies in the country that share the features of decentralization and democratic governance (Rugambwa, 2009). Population programs should not&mdash;and cannot&mdash;stand alone. Political commitments matter, as do generalized institutional and governance reforms, without which no social policy can succeed. In a review of family planning programs, Bongaarts et al. (1990) concluded that political commitment, flexibility, sensitivity to the cultural context, and receptivity to individual needs and choices are essential for success. These same features are essential for the success of any policy intervention. These features are only compatible with a decentralized, inclusive governance model.&nbsp;
<h3>Conclusion</h3>
Egypt is and will remain a populous country, and this is one of the main reasons Egypt is a major country on the world stage. Population size, indeed, has its power. Throughout history, countries with larger populations have been the stronger countries&nbsp;ceteris paribus. The demographic dilemma, however, resides in that qualification; it is never the case that everything else is equal. A country&rsquo;s strength resides not simply in the number but in the quality of its people. The population issue in Egypt is not about its large population size but the unsustainability of the current rate of population growth. Given current economic growth and limited natural resources, especially water and food, a total fertility rate (TFR) of 3.0&ndash;3.5 children per woman is simply unsustainable. Each new population prospects report by the UN Population Division extends the date by which Egypt&rsquo;s TFR is expected to reach replacement level: once 2017, it now stands at 2070. Egypt thus seems poised to add millions to its population every year with ever declining prospects for proper education, decent work, and acceptable living standards. The solution is not to declare population a &lsquo;problem.&rsquo; It is to recognize people as a real resource&mdash;one whose value derives not from their collective number but from who they are and what they can achieve. Without respect for people&rsquo;s dignity and free choice, however, that resource is not just wasted, it is transformed from a strength to a weakness.
<hr>
References
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Aspalter, C. (2002). Population policy in India. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 22(11/12), 48&ndash;72.
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Basten, S. &amp; Jiang, Q. (2014). China&rsquo;s family planning policies: Recent reforms and future prospects. Studies in Family Planning, 45(4), 493&ndash;509.
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Bongaarts, J., Mauldin, W. P., &amp; Phillips, J. (1990). The demographic impact of family planning programs. Studies in Family Planning, 21(6), 299&ndash;310.
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Day, F. A. (1982). Family planning in the third world: Conceptual considerations and application to rural Thailand [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. University Microfilms International 8222076.
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Lantos, L. (2019, September 19). <a style="color: #333333;" href="https://overpopulation-project.com/one-of-the-most-efficient-family-planning-programs-in-the-world-rwanda/">Rwanda: A pioneer of family planning in sub-Saharan Africa</a>. The Over Population Project.&nbsp;
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Rob, U., Ul Mutahara, M., &amp; Sprafkin, N. (2004). Development of population policy in Bangladesh. International Quarterly of Community Health Education, 23(1), 25&ndash;38.&nbsp;
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