<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Introduction</h3>
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) crisis has negatively impacted the bilateral relations between Egypt and Ethiopia after it became one of the most pressing political issues between the two countries on both the African and international stages. Although it is a conflict of interests between the two parties, it does not necessarily have to lead to conflict or war. Both sides could be considered as winners by overcoming this issue, as it is not a zero-sum game. This can only be achieved by applying the principle of benefit-sharing in the Nile River basin among Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, similar to what has been implemented in several international rivers, particularly in Africa, such as the Orange River.
The intensity of the media and diplomatic conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia has escalated following the Ethiopian government's announcement of the completion of the concrete works for the GERD and the transition to the operational phase, coinciding with the full filling of the dam's reservoir. This was accompanied by Egypt sending military equipment and delegations to Somalia in accordance with the mutual defense agreement signed between Cairo and Mogadishu in August 2024. In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia protested against the Egyptian military assistance to Somalia, considering it a dangerous intervention in the region's affairs and a direct threat to Ethiopia's strategic interests. This was followed by the Ethiopian government announcement of the activation of the Entebbe Agreement. This action was rejected by Egypt deeming it a violation of international law and a threat to its national security. Does this mean that Egypt will use its hard power after relying on soft power for nearly two decades? Or will Egypt&nbsp; leverage the mutual defense agreement with Somalia as a pressure tactic in the new phase of negotiations with the Ethiopian government?
Hence, this commentary will review the principle of benefit-sharing and the key alternative policies proposed to achieve this in the Nile basin. This is in addition to enabling the riparian states to cooperate in facing future challenges, such as climate change and its anticipated impacts on Nile River resources, as a sustainable cooperative solution. Additionally, it discusses the most significant policies proposed globally regarding the joint cooperative management of international river resources, and how these can be implemented and utilized to reach solutions for the GERD crisis.
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">First: Ethiopian hegemony and fruitless negotiations since 2011</h3>
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The power of Ethiopian ideology: Ethiopia has relied on the power of ideology and discourse in its hegemony over the sources of the Nile River and the construction of the GERD. Addis Ababa has promoted specific ideas to the international community, claiming that the dam will serve the interests of both upstream and downstream countries. It asserted that storing water in the Blue Nile would reduce evaporation and increase water flow downstream. According to Ethiopia, this would provide hydroelectric power for the entire region, along with managing flood control and sediment. On February 20th, 2022, Ethiopia officially began producing 375 megawatts of electricity from the dam using one turbine. Upon its completion, the GERD is expected to turn Addis Ababa into a significant electricity source for several neighboring countries, including Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and possibly Egypt&mdash; rather than escalating potential conflict and war among Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia (Hailu, 2022, p. 95).
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Support from donor countries: The availability of international funding from donor countries such as China has enabled Ethiopia to challenge other international donor institutions, such as the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. These institutions required Egypt&rsquo;s approval as the downstream country, in accordance with international law governing transboundary rivers, before providing any financial transfers for projects on the Nile (Abdel Rahman, 2020, p. 44).&nbsp;
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For example, the Ethiopian government awarded the dam's construction contract to two China state-owned companies: China Gezhouba Group, contracted for $40.1 million, and Voith Hydro Shanghai, that participated in the dam's construction with a contract valued at $113 million. Additionally, the State Grid of China Electric Power Equipment and Technology (SGCC) built the high-voltage transmission line necessary for power transfer to the dam at a cost exceeding one billion dollars (Al-Shafei, 2020).&nbsp;
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The domestic scene in Ethiopia: The instability within Ethiopian society, due to internal political unrest and violent confrontations among political factions, since 2019&nbsp; when Abiy Ahmed dissolved the old ruling coalition, has strongly motivated the government to amplify the issue of the dam crisis. The regime sought to mobilize the Ethiopian ethnic groups around a unifying development project to distract them from internal conflicts and wars, particularly after the escalation of conflict between the central government and opposing movements in the Tigray. Moreover, this strategy aimed to cover up internationally the violations documented by international organizations against the Tigray people by Abiy Ahmed&rsquo;s government (Amar, 2022, p. 166).
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<h3 dir="ltr" role="presentation">Second: from water sharing to benefit sharing</h3>
The dispute over water shares among riparian states in shared river basins often leads to a zero-sum game, resulting in winners and losers. This is an outdated and traditional concept. Instead, researchers propose the idea of "benefit sharing" based on mutual agreement. It is believed that distributing the benefits of water can yield positive outcomes, as evidenced in the basins of the Orange, Senegal, and Columbia rivers. In other words, if the focus shifts from quantitative water shares to the various benefits derived from water use across multiple sectors&mdash;including economic, social, and political&mdash; riparian states will be able to view the water issue more constructively and achieve positive results from its utilization (Qaddumi, 2008, p. 4). In this context, the cooperation becomes essential not only for reducing water loss and increasing its quantity but also for mitigating drought, ensuring food security, harnessing hydroelectric power, and preventing and monitoring water pollution. In short, cooperative development of transboundary water resources helps alleviate poverty and yields economic benefits, including, but not limited to, flood control, improved irrigation projects, and hydroelectric power development (Sadoff &amp; Grey, 2007, pp. 545&ndash;571).&nbsp;
A notable example of the application of the benefit-sharing principle is the Mekong River basin, shared by Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. Relations among the riparian states of the Mekong have been tumultuous for decades, primarily due to border disputes that do not involve the river itself. However, benefit sharing within the river basin has contributed to a degree of stability in the region and brought significant benefits to the riparian countries &mdash;not all related to the river. Despite ongoing conflict between Laos and Thailand for years, Laos has been exporting hydroelectric power to Thailand, which continued to pay for it. Similarly, the Thai government has followed a clear strategy to increase regional stability through "mutual dependency". Thailand purchasing gas from Myanmar and Malaysia and hydroelectric power from Laos and China. This strategy of mutual dependency provided the basin countries with low-cost imported supplies helping to forge good relations and ties among them. In reality, water relations have led to interdependence and facilitated economic cooperation among these countries (Sadoff &amp; Grey, 2002, p. 400).
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Third: how to implement benefit sharing between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan</h3>
After Ethiopia completed the GERD concrete works and moved to the fifth filling phase, the Egyptian government has no choice but to negotiate the sharing of benefits derived from the dam's hydroelectric power. For instance, a bilateral agreement could be established between Egypt and Ethiopia to transport and export hydroelectric power to Europe through former, leveraging Egypt's strategic geographical location and its expertise in building electricity transmission and export stations. In return, Ethiopia would commit to reaching an agreement on the filling and operation of the GERD that ensures Egypt's water security. Such an agreement would also help reduce the water deficit for both Egypt and Sudan, as it would allow Ethiopia to export larger amounts of hydroelectric power, encouraging it to operate more turbines. This will result in releasing larger quantities of water behind the dam, which would otherwise deprive Egypt and Sudan of their water shares (Etichia, Basheer et al, 2024).
Looking at the Nile basin overall and the Eastern Nile basin in particular, it becomes clear that cooperation in managing the water resources of the Nile and benefit sharing can only be achieved by linking water issues to cooperation in non-water aspects, such as trade, investment, or development. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan must collaborate on managing the waters of the Blue Nile and the Nile River, as well as adapting to climate change, floods, and droughts.
In this context, Egypt must take the initiative to implement commercial interdependence strategy with Ethiopia to mitigate Ethiopian hegemony over the sources of the Nile and to protect its own commercial interests. This can be achieved through several measures, including:
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Boosting trade between the two countries throughout increasing Egypt's imports of certain Ethiopian goods, such as meat and agricultural products like sugar, coffee, and tea. Egypt relies heavily on importing these crops to meet its domestic needs, while Ethiopia produces them in large quantities. However, Egypt's imports of coffee, tea, and spices from Ethiopia amounted to only $4.6 million in 2022, compared to $278.7 million from Kenya, for example, for the same goods that year&nbsp; (CAPMAS, Annual Bulletin: Trade Between Egypt and Nile Basin Countries, 2022, pp. 24-27).
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Directing Egyptian investments in irrigation technology to Ethiopia, as Egypt owns 3.077 million hectares of arable land reliant on irrigation as of 2021. In addition, Egypt has significant expertise in modern irrigation methods, which can assist Ethiopia, which largely depends on rain-fed agriculture. According to the World Bank, Ethiopia has 16.314 million hectares of irrigable land as of 2021, providing an opportunity for Egypt to invest in irrigation and export knowledge in modern irrigation techniques, thereby building Ethiopian capacities. In return, Egypt could receive lower-priced imports of meat and agricultural products that consume large amounts of water, instead of cultivating them domestically&mdash;known as "virtual water trade."
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Establishing a strong Egyptian presence in proposed projects in Nile basin countries and providing logistical support, expertise, and necessary technologies to upstream countries in general. This would prevent Ethiopia and other countries from unilaterally establishing water projects, ensuring the achievement of Egyptian interests while providing the necessary infrastructure expertise to countries that lack it. Efforts should also focus on projects that reduce water wastage from the Nile in Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan, such as the Jonglei Canal project in South Sudan.
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<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Conclusion&nbsp;</h3>
In conclusion, cooperative solutions are both viable and necessary, and benefit sharing in the Nile does not necessarily equate to sharing water shares. Instead, all riparian states can gain more water and benefits through integrated management of the river's resources while being mindful of future challenges, such as climate change and rising temperatures, which threaten some riparian countries with droughts.
Mutual dependence strategy represents a crucial factor in the future of economic relations among Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia. This necessitates peaceful intervention from both the Egyptian and Ethiopian sides to address the internal crises facing Sudan, enabling them to implement mutual dependence and cooperate in managing shared water resources, as well as sharing the resulting water, economic, electrical, and political benefits from the river, which ultimately contribute to achieving regional peace and security.
Finally, the principle of benefit sharing can also help riparian states in the Nile basin manage carbon emissions and reduce their levels by decreasing reliance on fossil fuels for electricity production and replacing them with lower-cost hydroelectric power. This would help control global warming rates and address climate change challenges, including floods, drought, and desertification.
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References
&nbsp;English References
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Ashebir Dingeto Hailu,(2022), Ethiopia hydropower development and Nile basin hydro politics, AIMS Energy, 10(1): 87&ndash;101.
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Claudia W. Sadoff, David Grey, (2002) "Beyond the river: the benefits of cooperation on international rivers", Water Policy, 4,(5).&nbsp;
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David Grey, Claudia W. Sadoff;( December 2007) "Sink or Swim? Water security for growth and development", Water Policy, 1,(6).&nbsp;
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Etichia, M., Basheer, M., Bravo, R.&nbsp;et al. (2024),&nbsp;Energy trade tempers Nile water conflict.&nbsp;Nat Water&nbsp;2, 337&ndash;349. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44221-024-00222-9.
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Halla Qaddumi,( July 2008), Practical Approaches to Transboundary Water Benefit Sharing, UK: preliminary form for discussion and critical comment Overseas Development Institute, working paper292.
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المراجع العربية&nbsp;
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الجهاز المركزي للتعبئة العامة والإحصاء، (نوفمبر، 2023)، النشرة السنوية: التبادل التجاري بين مصر ودول حوض النيل عام 2022 (القاهرة، مرجع رقم 71).
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عبدالرحمن، ح. (2022). أزمة سد النهضة: تحدي الهيمنة المائية والمأزق السوداني المصري. مجلة دراسات شرق أوسطية، 24 (93).&nbsp;
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عمار، ر. (2022). السياسة الإثيوبية تجاه نهر النيل من منظور القوى الجيواقتصادية المائية، المجلة العلمية لكلية الدراسات الاقتصادية والعلوم السياسية، 5، (14).
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مجموعة البنك الدولي، الأراضي القابلة للزراعة (هكتار) &ndash;VS Egypt Ethiopia، تاريخ الدخول: 2 أكتوبر 2024، <a href="https://data.albankaldawli.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.HA?locations=ET-EG&amp;most_recent_value_desc=true">https://data.albankaldawli.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.HA?locations=ET-EG&amp;most_recent_value_desc=true</a>&nbsp;
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الشافعي، هـ. (12 أكتوبر 2020). الصين وإثيوبيا.. مصالح متبادلة. تاريخ الاسترداد: 1 أكتوبر 2024، من موقع المركز المصري للفكر والدراسات الإستراتيجية، <a href="https://marsad.ecss.com.eg/42134">https://marsad.ecss.com.eg/42134</a>&nbsp;
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آراء

Commentaries

إدارة الموارد المائية

Water Management

الطاقة

Energy

زراعة

Agriculture

السياسات الاقتصادية

Economic Policies

الخروج من المعادلة الصفرية… تقاسُم مياه نهر النيل بين دول المنبع والمصب

Exiting the Zero-Sum Equation: Water Sharing of the Nile River Between the Riparian States

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