<h2>Introduction</h2>
For almost 30 years, South Africa has been grappling with the aftermath of Apartheid racial discrimination and the complex task of implementing transformation through both social and economic reforms. One such new proposal within the water sector has highlighted not only the difficulties, fears, and potential dangers inherent in transformation policies; but also demonstrates the necessity of transformation in the water sector to avoid an arduous future for all.
This article discusses the proposed new transformation requirement and how current policy conditions have led to little change from the pre-1994 racial imbalances in the large-scale use and distribution of water in South Africa. In addition, the pressing need to consider effective transformation policies will be highlighted, followed by some recommendations for future action and study.
<h3 dir="ltr">Proposed changes</h3>
In South African law, water is considered a public domain resource that cannot be &lsquo;owned&rsquo; by anyone other than the state, which must administer, control, safeguard and develop this resource in the public interest (Republic of South Africa, 1998, pg.18; Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2022, pg.5). As such, any use of water that exceeds &ldquo;reasonable domestic use,&rdquo; must apply for a water-use licence under the 1998 National Water Act (NWA), in order to legally take, use, store, divert, affect quality and/or construct, operate or maintain works related to water (Republic of South Africa, 1998, pg.20).
On May 19th 2023, the South African Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) proposed amendments to the NWA, adding requirements to the water-use licence application process, to improve and accelerate the equitable allocation of water resources (Creamer Media (Pty) Ltd, 2023, pg.12). Among the amendments presented, a new race-based transformation requirement would be added to licence applications, which depending on the volume of water in cubic meters (m3) and the area covered in hectares (ha); would require either a 25%, 50% or 75% Black/Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs) shareholding in the applicants venture for the water-use licence to be awarded (Department of Water and Sanitation - B, 2023, pg.13).
The proposed implementation of racial quotas within the water sector was met with opposition from farmers, agricultural groups, and even the Western Cape provincial government (Bega, 2023; BusinessTech - A, 2023). Those opposed highlighted how making race a central criterion for licences could place South Africa&rsquo;s food security at risk at a time when both commercial and subsistence farmers are already struggling with climate change-driven droughts, rising temperatures, weather fluctuations, water renewal and even crop growing patterns (Ngcuka, 2022). Additionally, the inability of most Black people to afford shareholding stakes in ventures raised concerns over how existing debts for infrastructure linked to the licences would be divided, especially considering existing local and international players in the agriculture sector. These concerns were presented to the DWS alongside a request for further clarification on this proposal (BusinessTech - B, 2023; Bega, 2023). In response, the DWS released a media statement on June 15th 2023, in which it said:
&ldquo;The transformation requirements categories as envisaged in the current review of Regulations are only applicable to applications for new water-use licences and are not applicable to renewal of existing water-use licenses&rdquo; (Department of Water and Sanitation - C, 2023).
The statement went further, clarifying that at current estimates around 98.5% of available water resources in South Africa &mdash; the remaining water after the reserves for basic human needs (drinking water, hygiene) and ecological needs to maintain the aquatic ecosystem (Republic of South Africa, 1998, pg. 30) &mdash; have already been allocated and the new transformation requirements would only apply to new licence applications for the remaining 1.5% of available water (Department of Water and Sanitation - C, 2023).
Thus, practically no significant transformation in water use would occur from these proposed race-based quotas despite evidence that large-scale and effective transformation is not only desired but needed to effectively address the poverty, inequality, and unemployment challenges faced by South Africa.&nbsp;
<h3 dir="ltr">Status Quo of South African Water-use</h3>
As it stands today, the majority of water in South Africa, an estimated 77%, comes from surface water running in rivers which is generated from an estimated 8% of South Africa&rsquo;s land area (UNESCO, 2006, pg.502; Colvin et al., 2013; Smith-Adao, 2018). This reliance on surface water can be seen in the distribution of water use, with agriculture (including afforestation and livestock watering) being the largest user accounting for 66%, while municipal and domestic uses shape 27% (The Department of Water and Sanitation - A, 2023, pg.15). The remaining 7% of total yearly water usage is utilized in power generation, mining and bulk industrial activities (The Department of Water and Sanitation - A, 2023, pg.15).
Historically, due to the Apartheid race-based policies, the majority of land and water rights were granted to predominately white-male South Africans (Jegede &amp; Pumzile Shikwambane, 2021, pg.3). With the transition into a democratic rule in 1994, new political and legal mandates were created to transform and redress the racial, social, and economic imbalances of the past (Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2020, pg.211; Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2022, pg.7). Transformation efforts played a major role in the formulation and passing of the NWA in 1998, making what would become the DWS the sole custodian of all water resources in South Africa, with the mandate to protect and manage water in the public interest (Republic of South Africa, 1998, pg.18; Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2020, pg.210). Among the host of changes that the NWA brought into effect, were two broad policy concepts aimed to manage water use and its stable reallocation to address the need for racial transformation.
The first is that all water use over a certain limit in volume and/or area, as determined by the DWS and its Minster, would require the application for a water-use licence (Republic of South Africa, 1998, pg.42). The licencing process would consider several factors such as the intended use of the water, its class and quality, the strategic importance, investments already made, the socio-economic impact, and the need to redress the aftermath of past racial and gender discrimination (Republic of South Africa, 1998, pg.44). If accepted, the licence would be granted for 40 years and reviewed every five years (Republic of South Africa, 1998, pg.44).
The second broad policy decision made was that all &ldquo;Existing Lawful Water Use&rdquo; that occurred under the previous Apartheid 1956 Water Act &mdash; within two years (1996) of the passing into law of the NWA in 1998 &mdash; would be entitled to continue without change or a licence, until such as time as new compulsory water-use licence regulations are introduced (Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2020, pg.211; Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2022, pg.5). This policy was adopted as a transitional measure designed to prevent excessive disruption of existing water systems and the sectors that relied on them at the time (Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2020, pg.211).
However, after 30 years, these two broad policy decisions have had the following effects according to various research studies and records from the DWS. Of the nearly 60,000 &ldquo;Existing Lawful Water Use&rdquo; entitlements issued, covering an estimated 5.8 billion m3 of water a year, 98.54% are allocated to White/Historically Advantaged Individuals (HAIs) and only 1.46% have been granted to Black/HDIs (Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2020, pg.212; Creamer Media (Pty) Ltd, 2023, pg.12). Furthermore, of all the issued water-use licences since 2013, 60% of them have been allocated to White/HAI, while only 20% have gone to Black/HDIs, and the remaining 20% going to municipalities or other government entities (The Department of Water and Sanitation - A, 2023, pg.35).
<h3>Why Transformation Must Happen in South Africa?</h3>
This slow rate of transformation can be attributed in part to (Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2020, pg.213):
<ul>
<li dir="ltr" role="presentation">Funding and knowledge capacity shortfalls in the DWS.</li>
<li dir="ltr" role="presentation">The lack of knowledge and financial ability by emerging black farmers to apply for water-use licences.</li>
<li dir="ltr" role="presentation">The absence of coordination between departments responsible for land redistribution, water allocations, and rural infrastructure.</li>
<li dir="ltr" role="presentation">Strong opposition by those with the &ldquo;Existing Lawful Water Use&rdquo; entitlements, to any law changes that could see their &ldquo;rights&rdquo; to water removed or curtailed.</li>
<li dir="ltr" role="presentation">Finally, some of the catchment areas are in a closed state, where all potential water has already been allocated; with a long complex process of comparing potential water-use licence applications needed before any reallocations can occur.</li>
</ul>
These factors and numerous others are all compounded by the fact that South Africa is one of the 30 driest countries in the world, and already experiences high levels of water stress (Bega, 2023; Creamer Media (Pty) Ltd, 2023, pg.20). Experts have warned that a scenario of tight and regular water rationing might become a reality as soon as 2030 with a projected future demand of 63 billion m3 of water a year, significantly greater than the current 38 billion m3 of usable water estimated to be available in South Africa (Creamer Media (Pty) Ltd, 2023, pg.23).
Thus, transformation in the South African water sector is not only necessary to redress the injustices and racial imbalances of the past but is also a necessary element in re-prioritising and managing the increasingly scarce resource that is usable water. The proposed implementation of a race-based shareholding requirement for future water-use licences is not the policy answer needed here in this specific and complex convergence of water, land, infrastructure, economic, and social issues in South Africa.
<h3 dir="ltr">Conclusion</h3>
More in-depth research is needed to balance the social and economic ramifications of a water use policy; one that accelerates the pace of racial transformation and access in South Africa. However, some broad recommendations can be presented (Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2020, pg.214; Bosch &amp; Gupta, 2022, pg.212; Chikozho et al., 2020, pg.231):
<ol>
<li dir="ltr" role="presentation">Water-use licences should be tied to the physical location, such as the farmland itself, in which it will be used and not tied to individuals or enterprises.</li>
<li dir="ltr" role="presentation">The ability to transfer water-use licences from one holder to another should be curtailed or removed entirely. Currently, parties not involved in the initial licence application, nor connected to the initial area to which it would apply, can be granted the water-use licence instead of the new landowners.</li>
<li dir="ltr" role="presentation">The granting of redistributed land to emerging Black farmers should immediately come with a reasonable water-use licence included, to support new agricultural enterprises.</li>
<li dir="ltr" role="presentation">&ldquo;Existing Lawful Water Use&rdquo; entitlements should be explored in depth and reviewed to understand the full economic and social benefits attained from them.</li>
<li dir="ltr" role="presentation">The concept of water licences should also be reevaluated and alternatives considered in light of the considerable administrative burden that it places on both the water sector and the DWS.</li>
</ol>
<hr>
References and suggested readings
<ul>
<li>Bega, S. (2023, June 8). Race-based water licence allocations draw ire of farmers &ndash; The Mail &amp; Guardian. The Mail &amp; Guardian. <a href="https://mg.co.za/news/2023-06-08-race-based-water-licence-allocations-draw-ire-of-farmers/">https://mg.co.za/news/2023-06-08-race-based-water-licence-allocations-draw-ire-of-farmers/</a></li>
<li>Bosch, H. J., &amp; Gupta, J. (2020). Access to and Ownership of Water in Anglophone Africa and a Case Study in South Africa. Water Alternatives, 13(2), 205-224.</li>
<li>Bosch, H. J., &amp; Gupta, J. (2022, September 25). The tension between state ownership and private quasi-property rights in water. WIREs Water, 10(1), 19.</li>
<li>BusinessTech - A. (2023, June 5). Farmers sound the alarm on 'race quotas' for water in South Africa. BusinessTech.&nbsp;<a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/693843/farmers-sound-the-alarm-on-race-quotas-for-water-in-south-africa/">https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/693843/farmers-sound-the-alarm-on-race-quotas-for-water-in-south-africa/</a></li>
<li>BusinessTech - B. (2023, June 9). 'Race quotas' for water in South Africa &ndash; department clears up confusion. BusinessTech.&nbsp;<a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/694839/race-quotas-for-water-in-south-africa-department-responds/">https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/694839/race-quotas-for-water-in-south-africa-department-responds/</a></li>
<li>Chikozho, C., Managa, R., &amp; Dabata, T. (2020, April). Ensuring access to water for food production by emerging farmers in South Africa: What are the missing ingredients? Water SA, 46(2), 225-233.</li>
<li>Colvin, C., Nobula, S., &amp; Haines, I. (2013). An introduction to South Africa&rsquo;s Water Source Areas (E. Prince &amp; S. Nobula, Eds.). WWF South Africa.</li>
<li>Creamer Media (Pty) Ltd. (2023, October). Water 2023: South Africa's Looming Crisis (S. Barradas, D. Shepherd, &amp; R. Theron, Eds.; N. Odendaal, Compiler). Creamer Media (Pty) Ltd.</li>
<li>The Department of Water and Sanitation - A. (2023, March). National Water Resource Strategy III (3rd ed.). The Department of Water and Sanitation.</li>
<li>Department of Water and Sanitation - B. (2023, May 19). The Revision of Regulations Regarding the Procedural Requirements for Water Use Licence Applications and Amendments. Department of Water and Sanitation.</li>
<li>Department of Water and Sanitation - C. (2023, June 15). Media Statement: Clarity regarding Regulations on the Procedural Requirement for Water Use Licence Applications. Department of Water and Sanitation.</li>
<li>Jegede, A. O., &amp; Pumzile Shikwambane, P. (2021, April 16). Water &lsquo;Apartheid&rsquo; and the Significance of Human Rights Principles of Affirmative Action in South Africa. Water, 13(1104).</li>
<li>Ngcuka, O. (2022, October 6). Biggest threat to food security in South Africa is 'lack of subsistence farming' - panel warns. Daily Maverick. Retrieved March 27, 2024, from&nbsp;<a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-10-06-biggest-threat-to-food-security-in-sa-is-lack-of-subsistence-farming-panel-warns/">https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-10-06-biggest-threat-to-food-security-in-sa-is-lack-of-subsistence-farming-panel-warns/</a></li>
<li>Republic of South Africa. (1998, August 26). National Water Act 1998. In Government Gazette. Parliament of the Republic of South Africa.</li>
<li>Smith-Adao, D. L. (2018). Strategic Water Source Areas of South Africa | CSIR. CSIR. Retrieved March 27, 2024, from&nbsp;<a href="https://www.csir.co.za/strategic-water-source-areas-south-africa">https://www.csir.co.za/strategic-water-source-areas-south-africa</a></li>
<li>UNESCO. (2006). Water, A Shared Responsibility: The United Nations World Water Development Report 2 (J. Treves-Habar, Ed.; G. Young, Compiler). United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).</li>
</ul>

هل السياسات الجديدة لاستخدام المياه في جنوب إفريقيا عادلة؟

 Are South Africa's New Water Use Policies Fair?

<h3 dir="ltr">Introduction</h3>
Development is a widely debated concept. While the dictionary definition is simple, the literature on development offers various interpretations. These include development as change, intervention for improvement regardless of the outcome, advancement with a positive outcome as the objective, and a means for improvement that enables future development (Potter, et al., 2017). Moreover, our understanding of the term &lsquo;Development&rsquo; has changed due to global forces and theoretical advances (Potter, et al., 2017).
To assess progress in development, regardless of the definition used, it must be measured. The influence of development economics during the 1950s and 1960s has had significant implications for other development-related terminologies, particularly in identifying and characterizing underdeveloped countries (Potter, et al., 2017). However, the measurement of development relies on economic indicators that fail to acknowledge its multidimensional nature, an idea which will be explained in the following section.
The pursuit of economic growth under capitalism necessitates a yearly rise in GDP of 2-3%, which results in the doubling of the global economy every 23 years. This has perpetuated a ceaseless pattern of producing and consuming goods, many of which hold no social significance, all in the interest of maintaining growth and profit. Consequently, natural resources are being depleted, while the amount of waste generated per annum is increasing, leading to ecological crises in which humanity exceeds the safe scope for exploitation of planetary resources identified by the scientific community (Hickel, 2020).
<h3 dir="ltr">Measuring Development</h3>
Classical economics maintains that an increase in income determines a nation's success. Simon Kuznets, a Nobel laureate, introduced the use of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to measure US national income in the 1930s (Prasad &amp; Castro, 2018). GDP is the total value of goods and services produced within a country. It includes all output from residents in market and non-market sectors and encompasses government services. Gross National Product (GNP) measures a country's resident output regardless of location (Callen, 2023). Per capita scores of GNP and GDP are widely used to allow for cross-country comparisons.
Relying solely on GDP as a development measure is inadequate for several reasons. For one, it fails to consider the overall standard of living and well-being afforded to a nation&rsquo;s residents. Although GDP per capita is commonly used to gauge the welfare of the average citizen, it fails to account for critical factors such as environmental harm or other external costs. Furthermore, boosting output may come at the expense of leisure time or the depletion of non-renewable resources. In addition, factors like how a country&rsquo;s GDP is distributed among its residents may have a greater impact on their quality of life than just economic growth may be neglected (Callen, 2023).
For example, the United States of America (USA) ranks first in terms of GDP, but it has a high Gini index, a common income distribution measure. This implies a significant income gap between the richest and poorest individuals in the country (World Bank, 2023).&nbsp;
Over the years, various composite measures of development have been proposed. The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) was a previous measure that is now outdated and has been replaced by the Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The HDI is a composite measure of three indicators: Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, life expectancy, and educational attainment (White, 2014).
HDI is a measure of how well a country is doing in terms of its citizens' health, education, and standard of living. It takes into account life expectancy at birth, the average years of schooling for adults and children, and the gross national income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income to demonstrate that income becomes less important as it increases. The scores for each of these dimensions are combined using a geometric mean to create a composite index.&nbsp;
This can provide a powerful tool to compare and contrast different nations' human development outcomes. By examining two countries with similar GNI per capita, the HDI can highlight the stark differences in their respective social, economic, and political policies. This, in turn, can inspire meaningful discussions about the priorities and choices made by different governments and the impact they have on their citizens' well-being.
The HDI construct has been criticized for its use of a composite measure, which presents three main problems. First, determining which variables should be included in the index. Second, the weights assigned to the variables are arbitrarily chosen, which impacts the accuracy of the average. Finally, when multiple indicators are combined into a single number, some information can be lost (White, 2014). The HDI does not consider the indicators' distribution or income inequality within a country. Additionally, the HDI fails to account for important factors, such as political freedom, gender equality, and environmental sustainability.
<img style="display: block; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" src="https://lh7-us.googleusercontent.com/FzD85TrwDaT3rTds4KRjyl3NTDbRTPjV_j2B0IJFhDBvVgU9AK0FpJ2i8T_gcrVoiyoa9j06iszCOFo3WgnbCxRqNazzi_r69JFEu2lWuZXbEYThLAyCRYN2LqFLPb_OZ8mqe-cJpsbFvBilzep9_A" width="629" height="112">
To expand upon HDI, the UNPD has created several adjusted indexes incorporating additional factors (Figure 1). The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) accounts for inequality in the distribution of each dimension across the population. However, due to limited data availability, the IHDI is currently unable to assess the joint distribution of inequality in all three dimensions, i.e., income, health, and education. This means that while the IHDI can provide some insight into overall inequality in human development, it cannot provide a comprehensive overview of how inequality is distributed across all three dimensions (Klasen, 2018).
Figure 2, Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (HDI).
<img style="display: block; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" src="https://lh7-us.googleusercontent.com/8JXwcELEbPsnPAfp6ICJ2RrF_kUvp80nigeLOrFoC3YR3C8Peu2i5EHnJsvCmaTudwY19QfHZ-XxfbI5otlKe7Ll2OvEGLpY365SejVMjHMU4gDF8QQTym6SUEsW1-eOiONXidr8blxA-NYch8h_Eg" width="629" height="166">
Source: Human Development report 2021/2022 technical notes
In 1995, the UNDP introduced two indicators to measure gender-related development. However, the organization later realized that these indicators had some shortcomings and opted to rework them. Thus, the UNDP introduced two new indices - The Gender Development Index (GDI) and The Gender Inequality Index (GII) - to better address gender-related issues (Klasen, 2018). The Gender Development Index (GDI) measures gender inequalities in health, education, and command over economic resources. The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects gender-based disadvantages in reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor market.
Figure 3, Gender Development Index (GDI) and The Gender Inequality Index (GII))
<img style="display: block; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" src="https://lh7-us.googleusercontent.com/9dcmYqT-L6z3u3t4x7r2Ur-YoZbZBWZCVs0i0ecXUx-KjVXKUzvR0xKH9WS30hDNzA-KIcUYrn-mbgVD3gUcLaIIYzNC7mGeuxl78XocNp76aIdCEg5ngmrLM9aEWR8peASLHbFmZzQEYHCBCQ94kg" width="629" height="372">
Source: Human Development report 2021/2022 technical notes
The global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), introduced in 2010, measures the deprivations of health, education, and standard of living at the household level (UNDP, 2023). The index is comprehensive and takes into account various factors beyond income to assess poverty levels. It assesses people's capabilities and measures their access to basic needs such as education, health, and decent living conditions. Designed to complement income-focused indicators, the MPI provides a more nuanced understanding of poverty. It is worth noting that there are gaps in all the indexes, especially with regard to sustainability measures, which focus on Earth&rsquo;s preservation and the resource base required to meet current and future human needs (Klasen, 2018).
Figure 4, Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)
<img style="display: block; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" src="https://lh7-us.googleusercontent.com/GYL4PyKiMcaD0Onzhs10A32EN9Nfnaor4kLve_iC4h9pteUYMLdh3cQY0qUR5QoTHlg0U7_mn5P5seqtHhaPeM1Qn5ksPXhozPP2tpKTpnrpVNjgqnDVzx-qFmRK8mQAzZKTDQ0hsQxRhP_Sn6vpfw" width="629" height="129">
Source: Human Development report 2021/2022 technical notes
The Social Progress Index (SPI) report, created in 2013, gauges social progress. It is independent of traditional economic indicators and has three dimensions, 12 components, and 60 hands. The 12 components relate to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) &ndash; tracking the progress made toward these goals and predicting performance by 2030 (Social Progress Imperative, 2022). However, one of the main criticisms of the SPI Index is its heavy reliance on Western values (Rowan, 2022).
<img style="display: block; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" src="https://lh7-us.googleusercontent.com/XvcaI6-ZWmqm-1JuyKCvGtWjEHjIZNQqZxTSW8hYe7gK8vRUP5PI1ezDAEC9I2MFIdkmG0zZ-KClxFjONNDByEOeHlQ1DXIhzikR-n-VQi80gz67WO6VFDQ6J-WDk6aFz9Vn2nhnwajAe6aJsP1A-A" alt="A diagram of wellbeing and wellbeingDescription automatically generated" width="629" height="298">
<h3 dir="ltr">Where Egypt Stands in different indices</h3>
Based on data from the World Bank, Egypt had the 28th largest GDP in 2022. However, when considering GDP per capita, Egypt ranked 140th (World Bank, 2023). In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), Egypt received a score of 0.731 and was ranked 97th for the 2021/2022 ranking, according to the UNDP. For the IHDI, Egypt scored 0.519 and dropped 21 spots to rank 118th for the same period, as reported by the UNDP (UNDP, 2023). Finally, Egypt received a low score and was ranked 113th out of 169 (Tier 4 out of 6 tiers) on the SPI, according to the Social Progress Imperative in 2022 (Social Progress Imperative, 2022).
<h3 dir="ltr">Conclusion</h3>
Examining development indicators is essential to uncover global disparities and justify support. However, these indicators have limitations and only provide a brief overview of development. The United Nations has introduced additional measures to address this. Development interventions should consider contextual factors that impact future generations' well-being, prospects, and survival.
Upon examining Egypt's development, it is apparent that the country's progress is marked by mixed indicators. While Egypt boasts one of the highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the region, it fails to score well when the social indicators are incorporated. The social indicators that Egypt lags behind on include basic needs such as access to healthcare, education, and sanitation facilities. Therefore, it is recommended that Egypt considers both economic and social indices to ensure sustainable development. By doing so, Egypt will not only maintain its economic growth but also improve the well-being of its citizens.
<hr>
References
<ul>
<li>Callen, T., 2023. International Monetary Fund. [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/Series/Back-to-Basics/gross-domestic-product-GDP [Accessed 10 November 2023].</li>
<li>Hickel, J., 2020. Less is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World. London: Penguin.</li>
<li>Klasen, S., 2018. Human Development Indices and Indicators: A Critical Evaluation, s.l.: UNDP Human Development Report Office.</li>
<li>Potter, R. et al., 2017. Questioning development. s.l.:Taylor &amp; Francis.</li>
<li>Prasad, M. K. &amp; Castro, A., 2018. International Growth Centre. [Online] Available at: https://www.theigc.org/blogs/gdp-adequate-measure-development [Accessed 17 November 2023].</li>
<li>Rowan, A., 2022. WellBeing International. [Online] Available at: https://wellbeingintl.org/social-progress-index/ [Accessed 10 November 2023].</li>
<li>Social Progress Imperative, 2022. : 2022 Social Progress Index, s.l.: Social Progress Imperative.</li>
<li>UNDP, 2023. 2021/2022 Technical Notes, s.l.: United Nations Development Programme.</li>
<li>White, H., 2014. The measurement of poverty. In: V. Desai &amp; R. Potter, eds. The Companion to Development Studies. s.l.:Taylor and Francis, pp. 60-66.</li>
<li>World Bank, 2023. The World Bank Group. [Online] Available at: https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&amp;series=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD&amp;country= [Accessed 10 November 2023].</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
Further Readings
<ul>
<li>Human Development Indices and Indicators: A Critical Evaluation. A report by UNDP</li>
<li>2022 Social Progress Index Methodology Report. A report by the Social Progress Imperative</li>
<li>Gross Domestic Product: An Economy&rsquo;s All. An article by Tim Callen (division chief in the IMF&rsquo;s Middle East and Central Asia Department)</li>
</ul>

هل يَكفي قياس التنمية حسب الناتج المحلي الإجمالي أم يُغْفِلُ عوامل عديدة؟

Measuring Development by GDP: Does It Say All?

<h3 dir="rtl">مقدمة&nbsp;</h3>
تستحوذ آثار الأزمة الاقتصادية على أحاديث المصريين في الحياة اليومية وعلى مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي، سواء بالشكوى المتصاعدة من ارتفاع الأسعار والتضخم وانخفاض قيمة الجنيه المصري، أو بالسخرية من الأحوال المعيشية التي تسببت في تراجع طبقي لفئات لا يستهان بنسبتها في المجتمع المصري، ورغم ذلك، لم تصل هذه الحالة التي يعيشها المواطن المصري العادي بشكل مماثل إلى الأعمال الفنية، بالتحديد في الدراما التلفزيونية لشهر رمضان 2024، التي يُنظر إليها عادة بأنها مرآة المجتمع، يمكن قياس أحوال ومزاج المصريين من خلالها كل عام.
قبل انطلاق موسم عرض المسلسلات بأيام قليلة، كانت البرامج التلفزيونية تمتلئ بالنقاشات حول أزمة غلاء الأسعار وانخفاض سعر صرف الجنيه وغيرها من الموضوعات الاقتصادية. لكن اختفت هذه النقاشات مع انطلاق المسلسلات الرمضانية، التي يراها البعض وسيلة للترفيه عن الجمهور لمساعدته في نسيان همومه المعيشية، في حين يراها آخرون منفصلة عن واقع المشاهد وغير قادرة على محاكاة ما يتعرض له في يومه، ولا تُمثل قصصها وموضوعاتها الأغلبية الطبقية في مصر.
يناقش هذا المقال ما إذا كانت الدراما الرمضانية تنكر الواقع الاقتصادي في مصر، ومدى مقاربة الأعمال لحياة الطبقات الاجتماعية خاصة الطبقة المتوسطة التي يبدو أنها تتناقص في الواقع وعلى الشاشة.
<h3 dir="rtl">هل تعكس الدراما الخريطة الطبقية في مصر؟</h3>
اللافت أن صناعة المسلسلات في مصر تعتمد بشكل رئيسي على التصنيف الطبقي في عملية الإنتاج، بالنسبة إلى فئات الجمهور، والتي تحدد النوع الفني لكل عمل، وهي أشبه بعُرف متبع بين المنتجين في تحديد نوعية الأعمال المقدمة بين 3 فئات جماهيرية "Class A" و"Class B" و"Class C"، وعادة ما تسمى الفئة الثالثة C بالدراما الشعبية وتدور أحداثها في المناطق الفقيرة في مصر، في حين تأتي الفئة الأولى غالبًا في المسلسلات الرومانسية أو التي أطلق عليها حديثًا "دراما الكومباوند"، نسبة إلى فئة سكان المجمعات السكنية الفاخرة والمسورة.
يرى عدد من صناع المسلسلات أن الفئة الشعبية تمثل نحو 70% من جمهور المسلسلات في مصر (الراي، 2016)، في نسبة تقترب بالفعل من نسبة الطبقات الفقيرة في مصر، التي تقدر بـ60% من إجمالي السكان، ممن يعانون من الفقر أو معرضون له (World Bank, 2019)، في حين تذكر بيانات الجهاز المركزي للتعبئة والإحصاء في مصر أن الطبقة الفقيرة في مصر تشكل نحو 29.7% في 2020، وصلت إلى 35.7% في وقت إنتاج مسلسلات رمضان (APS, 2023)، فهل انعكست هذه النسبة بالفعل على الدراما المصرية هذا العام؟
ضم موسم رمضان ما يقارب 30 مسلسلًا جديدًا (السينما دوت كوم، 2024)، بينها ما يقارب 8 أعمال&nbsp; تدور أحداثها في مناطق سكنية شعبية في مصر، في حين لم يكن من بينها مسلسلات تتعرض للفقر كموضوع مباشر في المحتوى الدرامي، سوى استثناءات قليلة منها مسلسل "أعلى نسبة مشاهدة"، الذي ناقش ظاهرة لجوء الطبقات الفقيرة إلى منصة "تيك توك" لحل أزماتهم المادية، بالإضافة إلى ذلك، فإن معظم هذه الأعمال الفنية استخدمت المناطق الشعبية كخلفية للأحداث وليست طرفًا أو محركًا لها، مثل مسلسل "المعلم" الذي تدور أحداثه حول صراعات بين تجار السمك، ومسلسل "المداح" الذي تدور قصته في إطار خيال علمي حول شخص يطارد الأشباح، ومسلسل "العتاولة" يحكي عن رجال العصابات في مدينة الإسكندرية.
<h3 dir="rtl">غياب الطبقة الوسطى عن الشاشة</h3>
تتصاعد الشكوى من قطاعات عديدة من الجمهور لعدم قدرة الدراما على محاكاة الواقع الطبقي في مصر، وضمنها الحديث عن تراجع حجم إنتاج المسلسلات الصعيدية كل عام رغم أن سكان الصعيد يمثلون نحو 30% من السكان CAPMAS, 2023))، إلا أن هذا الموسم ضم مسلسلين فقط عن هذه المنطقة الجغرافية بينها مسلسل "الكبير أوي 8" وهو كوميدي بأحداث خيالية.
ولكن الشكوى الأكبر تأتي من أبناء الطبقة الوسطى، التي تآكل حجمها في الواقع وفي الدراما أيضًا، فهي تتشارك نفس النسبة تقريبًا مع مسلسلات الطبقة الشعبية من العدد الكلي لأعمال هذا الموسم، وتظل مسألة نسبة تمثيلها في الدراما المصرية محل جدل كل "رمضان"، لاختلاف النظرة بين فئات المجتمع حول الصفات المحدِّدة للطبقة الوسطى، بالإضافة إلى التراجع الطبقي المستمر بفعل التضخم والأزمة الاقتصادية، والتي جعلت نسبة من الأسر المتوسطة تنزلق إلى الفئات الفقيرة أو على حدود الفقر.
ووفقًا لتقرير مؤسسة "فيتش سوليوشنز" البحثية فإن الطبقة المتوسطة في مصر هي التي تحقق دخلًا يتراوح من 79.2 ألف جنيه إلى 112 ألف جنيه بين عامي 2021 و2023، وهي الفئة التي تراجعت من 39% إلى 12% في عامين فقط من إجمالي عدد الأسر في مصر، ورغم ذلك لم يتعرض أي عمل درامي إلى قضية الانزلاق من طبقة أعلى إلى أخرى أقل، رغم ما تحتويه الفكرة من المقومات والمغريات الدرامية، ومع احتلال نقاشات التراجع الطبقي على المحتويات الساخرة على مواقع التواصل التي تمد الدراما بشكل كبير بالجمل الفكاهية "الإفيهات" كل عام.
<h3 dir="rtl">مسلسل "أشغال شقة".. نموذجًا لدراما الطبقة الوسطى</h3>
مع ذلك، فإن الطبقة المتوسطة، أو الطبقة التي أصبحت تعاني من شبح الوقوع في دائرة الفقر، حازت تمثيلًا نوعيًّا لافتًا في دراما رمضان 2024، لعكس الفئات الاجتماعية الأخرى، مع عدم التعرض بطريقة مباشرة للواقع الاقتصادي.
ويمكن ملاحظة&nbsp; تطور تناول هذه الطبقة مقارنة بالمواسم الأخيرة، ويلاحظ أيضًا أن الأعمال الفنية التي حققت تقييمات عالية من الجمهور هي تلك التي نجحت في الاقتراب من الواقع الاقتصادي والاجتماعي الحقيقي للمشاهدين.
وعلى رأسها المسلسل الكوميدي "أشغال شقة"، أبرز عمل فكاهي هذا الموسم وأكثرها رصدًا لشكل معيشة الطبقة المتوسطة، فبطل العمل يعمل طبيبًا في مصلحة الطب الشرعي، وزوجته تعمل مذيعة مبتدئة لكنها تتوقف عن العمل بعد إنجاب طفلين، وهنا تبدأ معاناتهم في البحث عن عاملة منزلية، وهو الحدث الطارئ على الأسرة وعلى مستواها الاجتماعي والمادي.
المسلسل مليء بالتفاصيل الاجتماعية التي تُعرض بطريقة مبتكرة وشاملة، فالأسرة تتعامل مع العديد من العاملات اللواتي يمثلن فئات مجتمعية عديدة، في حين تحاول الزوجة استعادة مسيرتها المهنية بتزييف واقعها الطبقي بالتقاط صور في مطاعم الأغنياء، وهي المشاهد التي أتاحت للمشاهدين معرفة دخل الأسرة الحقيقي، نحو 15 ألف جنيه كمرتب للزوج من وظيفته. وهنا كان "أشغال شقة"&nbsp; المسلسل الوحيد هذا الموسم الذي يحدد للمشاهد الإطار الاقتصادي الذي تتحرك داخله الأسرة ويحكم قراراتها حتى في اختيارها لمطعم تناول العشاء.
على عكس "أشغال شقة" كانت الأعمال الاجتماعية الأخرى، فلم تعطِ انطباعًا عن المستوى الاقتصادي للشخصيات والأسر وتأثيره في تصرفاتهم، فالمسلسل الاجتماعي "إمبراطورية م" الذي يحكي قصة رجل يتولى رعاية أبنائه الستة بعد وفاة زوجته، لا تدخل المتطلبات المادية للأبناء ضمن أحداث وصراعات الحكاية المقدمة، بل يُظهِر العملُ الأسرةَ كفئة متوسطة تسكن فيلا فاخرة في حي المعادي ويمتلكون سيارتين وعاملات بالمنزل ويلتحق الأبناء بمدارس وجامعات خاصة.
وجاء الصراع المادي الوحيد في العمل، بسبب خسائر شركة الرحلات السياحية لرب الأسرة نتيجة نقص الدولار، والتي تُذكر بشكل هامشي في الأحداث، في حين الصراع الأكبر يأتي بتلقيه عرضًا لبيع الفيلا بمبلغ يفوق 200 مليون جنيه ورغم ذلك يرفض ولا يتأثر مستوى معيشة الأسرة، وهي أحداث قد تبدو خيالية وغير منطقية بالنسبة إلى قطاع كبير من الجمهور المصري في ظل الأزمة الاقتصادية الراهنة.
<h3 dir="rtl">الفقر والانزلاق الطبقي على استحياء في الدراما المصرية</h3>
مثل "أشغال شقة"، جاء مسلسل "أعلى نسبة مشاهدة" ليشترك معه في دقة التفاصيل المادية لأبطال العمل، وعلى النقيض في النوع الفني، فهو عمل تراجيدي يحكي قصة أسرة تعيش في منطقة "الحطابة" الفقيرة والشعبية في القاهرة، وتعاني من فقر شديد وتواجه العديد من الأزمات بسبب شهرة فتيات الأسرة على منصة "تيك توك"، بعد سعيهن لتحسين دخلهن من خلاله.
رغم أن القصة الرئيسية للعمل حول تأثير "تيك توك"، إلا أن الفقر والتراجع الطبقي كان منافسًا رئيسيًّا في الأحداث، وربما لمرة نادرة في السنوات الأخيرة يرصد مسلسل مصري قصة رب أسرة بدأ في مواجهة الفقر بسبب إحالته إلى التقاعد، في إشارة إلى عدم كفاية معاش التقاعد في مصر وتآكل قيمته، ليخوض رحلة بين الوظائف المختلفة بعد تخطيه الستين، وهو نموذج جديد على الدراما المصرية وليس جديدًا على الواقع في السنوات الأخيرة.
وقدم العمل جانبًا جديدًا وواقعيًّا عن حياة المصريين اليومية، مثل استخدام الميكروباص بشكل يومي و"التوك التوك"، المنتشر في الأحياء الشعبية، بالإضافة إلى التعاملات المادية البسيطة مثل مشقة الأسرة في دفع إيجار العقار وشراء الملابس الجديدة وغيرها من التفاصيل الواقعية.
في النهاية، هناك مبرر جاهز وراء عدم قدرة صناع الدراما على مجاراة رغبة الجمهور المصري في رؤية نفسه وواقعه في الشخصيات والأعمال الدرامية، وهي المحاذير الرقابية والخوف من التصنيفات السياسية في حالة مناقشة الفقر والتراجع الطبقي بشكل جاد أو ساخر، مع الحساسية الشديدة من قبل النظام السياسي تجاه إظهار المجتمع المصري بصورة سلبية، والخوف من تهمة نشر الروح السلبية. دفع ذلك صناع الدراما إلى تجاوز الواقع، سواء بالموضوعات الخيالية أو التاريخية أو صراعات ومشكلات الأغنياء، والتي قد ترضي أيضًا ذوق فئات عديدة بالمجتمع، ولكن تظل التحولات الطبقية الدرامية في المجتمع بسبب الواقع الاقتصادي منطقة غير مستغلة في الدراما المصرية حتى الآن.
<hr>
المراجع
<ul>
<li dir="rtl" aria-level="1">
صحيفة الراي، (21 فبراير 2016): أحمد فهمي: 70 في المئة من الجمهور المصري... &laquo;Class C&raquo;!، متاح على: <a href="https://shorturl.at/mwxAS">https://shorturl.at/mwxAS</a>
</li>
<li dir="rtl" style="font-size: 10pt;" role="presentation">حلول للسياسات البديلة، (15 أكتوبر 2023): لقاء مفتوح في حلول للسياسات البديلة عن أرقام الفقر في مصر: زيادة من ورائها تضخم. متاح على: <a href="https://shorturl.at/fGQX4">https://shorturl.at/fGQX4</a></li>
<li dir="rtl" style="font-size: 10pt;" aria-level="1">
السينما دوت كوم، (2024): قائمة مسلسلات رمضان المصرية 2024. متاح على: <a href="https://shorturl.at/mwyBS">https://shorturl.at/mwyBS</a>
</li>
<li dir="rtl" style="font-size: 10pt;" aria-level="1">
الجهاز المركزي للتعبئة العامة والإحصاء، (مارس 2023): مصر في أرقام.
</li>
<li dir="rtl" style="font-size: 10pt;" aria-level="1">
المنصة، (5 نوفمبر 2023): بحساب الدخل بالدولار.. الطبقة الوسطى تتآكل في مصر. متاح على: <a href="https://manassa.news/stories/14352">https://manassa.news/stories/14352</a>
</li>
<li dir="rtl" style="font-size: 10pt;" aria-level="1">
أشغال شقة، Eproducers Productions، (19مارس 2024)، يوتيوب. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQkHK4D63zM">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQkHK4D63zM</a>
</li>
</ul>
&nbsp;
<ul dir="ltr">
<li>Poverty &amp; Equity Brief: Arab Republic of Egypt. <a href="https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/">https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/</a>. (n.d.). <a href="https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C">https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C750588BF00QA/current/Global_POVEQ_EGY.pdf&nbsp;</a></li>
</ul>

<h3>Introduction</h3>
The effects of the economic crisis are prevalent in the conversations of Egyptians in daily life and on social media websites &mdash; the discussions revolve around rising prices, inflation, and the devaluation of the Egyptian pound, and include the jokes and quips about the declining living conditions. However, these sentiments and realities that the average Egyptian citizen experiences were not reflected in this year&rsquo;s Ramadan television shows. Historically, these TV series mirrored society and acted as a barometer by which the conditions and mood of Egyptians can be measured each year.
A few days prior to the start of Ramadan, television programs were filled with discussions about the cost-of-living crisis, the declining exchange rate, and other economic topics. But these discussions disappeared with the launch of this year&rsquo;s Ramadan shows, which were somewhat divisive. Some view the Ramadan series as a means of escapism and entertainment, while others feel they were disconnected from the reality experienced by the viewer and do not depict the daily struggles that the majority of Egyptians face.
The article discusses whether Ramadan TV shows reject the economic reality in Egypt, and the accuracy with which they portray the lives of the various social classes, especially the Egyptian middle class, which seems to be disappearing both in reality and on-screen.
<h3 dir="ltr">Do the shows accurately reflect class stratification in Egypt?</h3>
It is important to note that the TV production industry in Egypt relies heavily on demographic profiles to target various audience groups and determine the artistic approach used in each show accordingly. Customarily, producers split the content into 3 categories: &ldquo;Class A,&rdquo; &ldquo;Class B,&rdquo; and &ldquo;Class C,&rdquo; which also reflects the series&rsquo; respective audience. The third category, &ldquo;Class C&rdquo; is usually called a &ldquo;shaabi drama&rdquo; and its events occur in poorer areas of Egypt. Meanwhile, &ldquo;Class A&rdquo; are often dramas or romantic series, which have been dubbed as &ldquo;compound dramas,&rdquo; in reference to the residents of gated communities and luxury residential complexes which they portray.
Numerous showrunners believe that the shaabi category represents roughly 70% of the audience in Egypt (Al-Rai, 2016). This percentage is indeed close to the figures released by the World Bank, which estimated that 60% of Egypt&rsquo;s total population faces poverty (World Bank, 2019). However, the statistic is disputed by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics which stated that the lower-income class in Egypt constituted about 29.7% in 2020, and rose to 35.7% at the time of production of the Ramadan series (APS, 2023). However, the question remains were these percentages reflected in the Egyptian dramas this year?
The Ramadan season saw the release of approximately 30 new series (Al-Cinema.com, 2024), of which 8 shows took place in popular residential areas in Egypt. None of the series dealt with the topic of poverty directly, with only a few exceptions, including the series &ldquo;Aala Nesbet Moshahda,&rdquo; which translates into the highest percentage of viewership. The drama series discussed the phenomenon of the lower-income class turning to TikTok to solve their financial crises. However, most of Ramadan&rsquo;s shows used densely populated low-income neighborhoods as backdrops for the shows, but these locations played no role and did not influence the story. The &ldquo;Al-Muallem&rdquo; series is a prime example. The show&rsquo;s events revolve around conflicts between fish merchants, but the show does not address the harsh living conditions that the citizens of these areas must endure. Similarly, &ldquo;Al-Maddah&rdquo; - a story with a science fiction element that follows a person chasing ghosts - and &ldquo;Al-Atawla&rdquo; a series that follows a group of gangsters in the city of Alexandria, disregard the financial crisis that Egypt is embroiled in.
<h3 dir="ltr">The absence of the middle class&nbsp;</h3>
Audiences of different socio-economic backgrounds have criticized the shows&rsquo; inability to mimic the realities in Egypt. Among the complaints is the lack of representation and the declining production volume of series set in Upper Egypt, despite the fact that the population of Upper Egypt represents approximately 30% of the populace (CAPMAS, 2023). This year only two shows were produced about this geographical area, including the &ldquo;Al-Kabir Awi 8&rdquo; series, which is a comedy with fictional events.
However, the chief complaint comes from Egypt&rsquo;s middle class, whose size has eroded in reality and in drama as well. During Ramadan, the percentage of shows about the middle class was roughly the same as the shaabi series or those geared towards Egypt&rsquo;s lower class. However, the lack of middle-class representation in Egyptian drama has become something of an annual controversy as different segments of society fail to agree on the defining characteristics of the middle class. Furthermore, the middle class continues to face a decline in living standards due to inflation and the economic crisis, which made a portion of middle-income families slide into the lower-income segment, bordering on poverty.
A Fitch Solutions research report defines the middle class in Egypt as households that earn an income ranging from 79,200 EGP &ndash; 112,000 EGP. Between 2021 and 2023, the number of families who fit into that category has declined from 39% to 12%. Despite this, no TV series tackled the idea of sliding from a higher class to a lower class, although such a storyline offers many dramatic elements that are relatable, and the plethora of class discussions and satirical content available on social media sites could supply such a show with various humorous lines.
<h3 dir="ltr">The series &ldquo;Ashghal Shaqa&rdquo; is an example of a middle-class drama</h3>
This year, few shows provided a remarkable depiction of the middle class, a class that is haunted by the specter of poverty. In contrast, other social groups did not receive such a portrayal, especially not of the economic issues. The treatment of middle-class issues was more nuanced in comparison to past years. It is also worth noting that the shows that received high ratings and glowing reviews from audiences were those that succeeded in representing the economic and social reality of the viewers.
Comedy series, &ldquo;Ashghal Shaqa,&rdquo; was perhaps the most prominent comic work this season and the one that focused on the middle class the most. The story follows a doctor in the Forensic Medicine Department, and his wife a TV anchor turned stay-at-home mum after giving birth to two children, as they search for a housemaid a quest that affects the family&rsquo;s social and financial state.
The series is full of societal comments that are presented in an innovative and comprehensive way. The family deals with many female workers who represent various societal groups. Meanwhile, the wife tries to revive her career by faking her socio-economic standing in society and taking pictures in expensive restaurants. Through the wife&rsquo;s attempts, the viewer discovers the family&rsquo;s real income, roughly 15,000 EGP, which is the husband&rsquo;s salary. &ldquo;Ashghal Shaqa&rdquo; was the only series this Ramadan that defined the economic limits within which the family operates and how that shapes its decisions, even simple ones like choosing a restaurant for dinner.
Unlike &ldquo;Ashghal Shaqa,&rdquo; other series did not demonstrate how the socioeconomic status of the characters impacts their behavior. In the drama series &ldquo;Embratoreyet Meem,&rdquo; the audience follows a single father taking care of his six children after his wife passes away. However, the financial needs of the children never become a focal point or a source of conflict in the story. Rather, the supposedly middle-class family lives in a luxurious villa in Maadi. They own two cars and have housemaids, with all the children attending private schools and universities.
The only financial conflicts in &ldquo;Embratoreyet Meem&rdquo; come about due to losses at the father&rsquo;s travel company in the wake of the dollar shortage, which is briefly mentioned. However, the biggest conflict takes place when the father receives an offer to sell the villa for an amount exceeding 200 million EGP, and despite refusing, the family&rsquo;s standard of living is unaffected. These are events that may seem unrealistic to a large segment of the Egyptian population in light of the current economic crisis.
<h3 dir="ltr">Poverty and downward mobility in Egyptian drama</h3>
Like &ldquo;Ashghal Shaqa,&rdquo; &ldquo;Aala Nesbet Moshahda&rdquo; accurately portrayed the details of the protagonists&rsquo; work and life. The tragedy tells the story of a family living in a low-income area of Cairo called &ldquo;Al-Hattaba&rdquo; where they face extreme poverty which leads the women to turn to TikTok as a means to improve their income but their popularity on the social media platform leads to more crises.&nbsp;
Although the main story of the TV series centers on the impact of TikTok, poverty, and class decline were key themes in the show. Perhaps for the first time in recent history, an Egyptian series delves into the life of the breadwinner after retirement. The show explores issues like insufficient pensions and the erosion of their value. In &ldquo;Aala Nesbet Moshahda,&rdquo; the head of the household shifts between different jobs despite passing the age of sixty, a normal occurrence in Egyptian society that had never been explored in a drama series before.&nbsp;
The work presented a new and realistic portrayal of Egyptians&rsquo; daily lives, including things like the daily use of microbuses and tuk-tuks, which are commonplace in poorer neighborhoods. In addition to showing the family&rsquo;s struggle to pay rent for the property, buy new clothes, and other realistic details.
<h3 dir="ltr">Conclusion</h3>
In conclusion, there is a justification as to why TV showrunners did not fulfill the public&rsquo;s desire to see their reality reflected in characters and dramatic works &ndash;- mainly censorship and fear of political backlash when discussing poverty and downward mobility whether in a serious or humorous manner. The political system deals with the portrayal of Egyptian society in a negative light with extreme sensitivity as such show creators fear these accusations. This led TV producers to favor fictional or historical topics or the struggles and problems of the rich, which may also satisfy the taste of many segments of society, while steering clear of the economic crisis and the subsequent class struggles.&nbsp;
<hr>
References
<ul>
<li dir="ltr">Al-Rai newspaper, (February 21, 2016): Ahmed Fahmy: 70 percent of the Egyptian public... &ldquo;Class C&rdquo;!, available at: <a href="https://shorturl.at/mwxAS">https://shorturl.at/mwxAS</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">Alternative Policy Solutions, (October 15, 2023): An open meeting in Alternative Policy Solutions on poverty numbers in Egypt: an increase behind which is inflation. Available at: <a href="https://shorturl.at/fGQX4">https://shorturl.at/fGQX4</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">Al-Cinema.com, (2024): List of Egyptian Ramadan Series 2024. Available at: <a href="https://shorturl.at/mwyBS">https://shorturl.at/mwyBS</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">Al-Manassa, (November 5, 2023): Calculating income in dollars... the middle class is eroding in Egypt. Available at: <a href="https://manassa.news/stories/14352">https://manassa.news/stories/14352</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">Apartment Works, Eproducers Productions, (March 19, 2024), YouTube. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQkHK4D63zM">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQkHK4D63zM</a></li>
<li dir="ltr">Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, (March 2023): Egypt in Numbers.</li>
<li dir="ltr">Poverty &amp; Equity Brief Arab Republic of Egypt. https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/. (n.d.). <a href="https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/current/Global_POVEQ_EGY.pdf">https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/current/Global_POVEQ_EGY.pdf</a></li>
</ul>

الدراما والمحاكاة الطبقية للجمهور المصري.. هل تنكر دراما رمضان 24 الواقع الاقتصادي؟

Media Reflecting Reality - Do the Ramadan 2024 TV Series Deny Economic Realities in Egypt?

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