<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Introduction</h3>
Economic sanctions have been one of the most dominant tools in the hands of the U.S. administration since the Cold War, often deployed when diplomatic efforts prove insufficient (Abdelal &amp; Bros, 2020). Sudan has a long history with U.S. sanctions, the most recent of which took effect on January 7, 2025, when the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the leader of Sudan&rsquo;s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as &ldquo;Hemedti,&rdquo; for his involvement in war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing campaigns, and for committing serious human rights violations, including widespread sexual violence and the execution of civilians and unarmed fighters (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025). Subsequently, the U.S. issued sanctions on the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, on the accusation of committing war crimes, including the indiscriminate bombing of civilians and infrastructure, as well as extrajudicial executions (Treasury, 2025).
This article examines the current state of the war and clarifies the role of external actors in fueling the conflict. It presents the Biden administration&rsquo;s handling of the crisis and management of the Sudanese war, and whether the current sanctions will succeed in silencing the sound of guns. Finally, it examines the future prospects of the conflict, with Donald Trump taking office as President of the United States.
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">External actors fuel the conflict in Sudan</h3>
The ongoing conflict between the SAF and the RSF has caused the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. The warring parties have committed war crimes, including ethnic cleansing campaigns&mdash;such as the campaign led by the RSF in West Darfur (International Rescue Committee, 2025). This power struggle between the army and the RSF cannot be separated from external alliances. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has supported the RSF financially and militarily to protect their joint economic interests in the illegal gold trade (Foreign Relations Committee, 2024), as explicitly stated by Burhan in a previous press conference.
Sudan&rsquo;s significance is not limited to gold. As a gateway to the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, Sudan has become a geopolitical powder keg, due to its strategic location on the Red Sea. This has turned Sudan into a battleground for influence among major powers like Russia, Egypt, and Iran, who have thrown their weight behind the SAF (Marks &amp; Alamin, 2024). For example, Egypt believes that a national army cannot be equated with a rebel armed militia (the RSF) (International Crisis Group, 2025). Meanwhile, Russia and Iran have supported the SAF in pursuit of their geopolitical goals.
The support of allies for both factions has not been limited to military aid but has also included political support. The UAE shielded Hemedti from Security Council sanctions following the siege of El Fasher, leading to weak and perfunctory resolutions. Similarly, Russia used its veto power to block a British-backed Security Council resolution on Sudan, which was supported by the Sudanese Foreign Ministry (Psaledakis &amp; Brunnstrom, 2024). Meanwhile, during its presidency of the African Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Egyptian Foreign Ministry sought to lift Sudan&rsquo;s suspension from the African Union (Talha, 2024). But what is most striking is the Biden administration&rsquo;s detachment from the Sudanese crisis, despite the massive humanitarian disaster and the war crimes committed by both sides&ndash;&ndash;a stance widely regarded as a stain on the legacy of American foreign policy (Goldberg, 2024).
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Biden&rsquo;s failed policies in the war in Sudan</h3>
During his farewell news conference, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken lamented&nbsp; that &ldquo;When it comes to Sudan, we haven't been able on our watch to get to that day of success.&rdquo; Tracking the timeline of U.S. actions reveals clear evidence of the Biden administration&rsquo;s slow and ineffective response to the crisis in Sudan. Just seven days after the war began, the U.S. shut down its embassy in Khartoum (U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, 2023) without opening a diplomatic office in Port Sudan, signaling a diminished American diplomatic presence in the region. It took the Biden administration ten months to appoint Tom Perriello as the U.S. special envoy for Sudan&mdash;a move made only under congressional pressure (U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, 2024). Perriello&rsquo;s first trip to Sudan came nine months after his appointment, but his lack of acceptance from the senior Biden administration officials hindered his influence over the external actors with whom he was negotiating (Hixon, 2025). Meanwhile, President Biden took 501 days from the start of the war to even mention Sudan at the UN General Assembly (UN Affairs, 2024), underscoring his administration&rsquo;s view that Khartoum and the war are not high priorities in U.S. foreign policy.
The U.S. relied on its main ally in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, to mediate the Sudanese conflict&ndash;&ndash;given Saudi Arabia&rsquo;s close ties with both Burhan and Hemedti. The Jeddah Declaration was signed in May 2023, but negotiations collapsed seven months later. The U.S. then supported a new initiative in Geneva, hosted by Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, and attended by Egypt and the UAE as observers. Once again, these efforts failed and did not halt the war. Eventually, Washington issued a decision to impose sanctions on both Burhan and Hemedti.
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Sanctions did not silence the guns</h3>
The U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on six companies linked to the RSF and three affiliated with the SAF. The sanctions were not only limited to companies but also targeted officials and military leaders, most prominent among them Abdul Rahim Dagalo and Algoney Dagalo, brothers of RSF leader Hemedti (U.S. Department of State, 2024). The Biden administration attempted to balance sanctions between the RSF and SAF, hoping to bring both sides to the negotiating table, while pointedly delaying sanctioning the leaders of each faction&ndash;&ndash;particularly Hemedti, whose forces have been accused of committing violent crimes and sexual slavery. This strategy proved ineffective as the conflict continued to escalate unabated (Human Rights Watch, 2024).
According to Hixon (2024), the delay in sanctioning Hemedti was due to his ties with the UAE, a strategic ally of the U.S., especially in the context of Israel&rsquo;s war on Gaza. This makes it clear that economic sanctions are often a political tool in the hands of the U.S. administration, rather than merely a means to end deadly conflicts, as the U.S. so often promotes. Notably, during George W. Bush&rsquo;s presidency, the U.S. also delayed the imposition of sanctions against the government of the ousted President Omar al-Bashir which would have disrupted his cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in exchanging intelligence about Al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden (Silverstein, 2005). Ultimately, this delay paved the way for catastrophic crimes in Darfur.
In 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department issued a report explaining that U.S. sanctions successfully exerted constructive pressure on Sudanese officials which affected their decision-making (Office of Foreign Assets Control, 2009). At that time, the Sudanese government paid attention to these decisions because they would affect the Sudanese people. Today, however, as long as the warring factions have access to other streams of support and financing, their sole focus remains on gaining power and victory. Therefore, to exert effective pressure, sanctions should be imposed on the external parties financing the conflict, as proposed by Congressman Michael McCaul, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives (Berg, 2024).&nbsp;
Biden left office without making any tangible change in the situation in Sudan, and now the crisis has been passed onto the next administration, headed by Donald Trump, who errs on the side of imposing control in resolving most crises (Magni, 2018).
<h3 dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify;">Conclusion</h3>
Many Americans view Trump as their savior in the country&rsquo;s struggle between good and evil, a sentiment reinforced by Trump, declaring: &ldquo;Many people have told me that God spared my life for a reason, and that reason was to save our country and to restore America to greatness&rdquo; ( Maqbool, 2024). Many Sudanese citizens and politicians are counting on Trump as a president capable of bringing peace to Sudan, just as he was able to halt the Israeli war on Gaza. Since the era of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, relations between Washington and Khartoum have been turbulent, but a historic shift in U.S.-Sudan relations emerged during Trump&rsquo;s first term, when he removed Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in exchange for normalization with Israel and signing the Abraham Accords, which was announced in January 2021. Some believe that Trump has strong ties with the belligerents of the ongoing war in Sudan from his allies in the Middle East, particularly the UAE, which may be more amenable to his demands to end the war, compared to those of the previous administration (Hixon, 2025). However, others argue that Trump follows the Republican Party&rsquo;s approach which prioritizes domestic affairs and limits foreign intervention in conflicts (Saleh, 2024). Therefore, Trump will not be willing to take strict measures against his strategic allies involved in the Sudanese war.
<hr>
References
<ul>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Abdelal, R., &amp; Bros, A. (2020). The end of transatlanticism? Horizons: Journal of international relations and sustainable development, (16), 114-135.</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Berg, M. (2024, 05 31). Lawmakers up pressure on Biden to change struggling Sudan policy. Retrieved from politico.com: <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/31/congress-biden-change-sudan-policy-00161060">https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/31/congress-biden-change-sudan-policy-00161060</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Foreign Relation Committee. (2024, 12 17). Risch, Warner, colleagues push Biden Administration to hold external actors accountable for exacerbating Sudan crisis. Retrieved from foreign.senate.gov: <a href="https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-warner-colleagues-push-biden-administration-to-hold-external-actors-accountable-for-exacerbating-sudan-crisis">https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-warner-colleagues-push-biden-administration-to-hold-external-actors-accountable-for-exacerbating-sudan-crisis</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Goldberg, M. L. (2024, 12 20). The Biden administration's hypocrisy on Sudan is a stain on his foreign policy legacy. Retrieved from globaldispatches.org: <a href="https://www.globaldispatches.org/p/the-biden-administrations-hypocrisy?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_content=share">https://www.globaldispatches.org/p/the-biden-administrations-hypocrisy?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_content=share</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Hixon, K. (2025, 01 21). A roadmap for Sudan in Trump&rsquo;s first 100 days. Retrieved from internationalpolicy.org: <a href="https://internationalpolicy.org/publications/a-roadmap-for-sudan-in-trumps-first-100-days/">https://internationalpolicy.org/publications/a-roadmap-for-sudan-in-trumps-first-100-days/</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Hudson, C. (2024, 07 11). Washington is becoming irrelevant in Sudan. A sanctions strategy could change that. Retrieved from csis.org: <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/washington-becoming-irrelevant-sudan-sanctions-strategy-could-change">https://www.csis.org/analysis/washington-becoming-irrelevant-sudan-sanctions-strategy-could-change</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Human Rights Watch. (2024, 12 15). Sudan: Fighters rape women and girls, hold sex slaves. Retrieved from hrw.org: <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/15/sudan-fighters-rape-women-and-girls-hold-sex-slaves">https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/15/sudan-fighters-rape-women-and-girls-hold-sex-slaves</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">International crisis group. (2025, 01 21). Sudan&rsquo;s calamitous war: Finding a path toward peace. Retrieved from crisisgroup.org: <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b204-sudans-calamitous-war-finding-path-toward-peace">https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b204-sudans-calamitous-war-finding-path-toward-peace</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">IRC. (2025, 04 17). Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help. Retrieved from International Rescue Committee: <a href="https://www.rescue.org/article/crisis-sudan-what-happening-and-how-help">https://www.rescue.org/article/crisis-sudan-what-happening-and-how-help</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Magni, M. (2018, 09 19). Why Trump's command and control style is set to lose. Retrieved from unibocconi.it: <a href="https://www.unibocconi.it/en/news/why-trumps-command-and-control-style-set-lose">https://www.unibocconi.it/en/news/why-trumps-command-and-control-style-set-lose</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Maqbool, A. (2024, 11 17). 'Anointed by God': The Christians who see Trump as their saviour. Retrieved from bbc.com: <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20g1zvgj4do">https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20g1zvgj4do</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Marks, S., &amp; Alamin, M. (2024, 12 18). Russian guns, Iranian drones are fueling Sudan&rsquo;s brutal civil war. Retrieved from bloomberg.com: <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-sudan-civil-war/">https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-sudan-civil-war/</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Office of Foreign Assets Control. (2009). Effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions with respect to Sudan: Report to Congress Jan 2009. Washington DC: Government of the United States of America.</li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Psaledakis, D., &amp; Brunnstrom, D. (2024, 11 18). Russia vetoes UN Security Council action on Sudan war. Retrieved from reuters.com: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-vetoes-un-security-council-action-sudan-war-2024-11-18/">https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-vetoes-un-security-council-action-sudan-war-2024-11-18/</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Saleh, F. M. (2024, 11 14). How Trump&rsquo;s foreign policy shift could impact Sudan. Retrieved from sudantribune.com: <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article293283/">https://sudantribune.com/article293283/</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">Silverstein, K. (2005, 04 29). Official pariah Sudan valuable to America&rsquo;s war on terrorism. Retrieved from latimes.com: <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-apr-29-fg-sudan29-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-apr-29-fg-sudan29-story.html</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">United Nations Affairs. (2024, 09 24). U.S. President Joe Biden affirms his determination to prevent an all-out war in the Middle East: Diplomacy is the only way in Lebanon. (al-Ra&rsquo;īs al-amrīkī Jō Biden yu&rsquo;akkid &lsquo;azmahu man&lsquo; ḥarb shāmila fī al-sharq al-awsaṭ: al-Diblūmāsīyah hiya al-sabeel al-waḥīd fī Lubnān). [In Arabic]. Retrieved from /news.un.org: <a href="https://news.un.org/ar/story/2024/09/">https://news.un.org/ar/story/2024/09/</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">U.S Department of State. (2024, 11 12). Sudan sanctions. Retrieved from www.state.gov: <a href="https://www.state.gov/sudan-sanctions/">https://www.state.gov/sudan-sanctions/</a></li>
<li dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;">U.S. Department of the TreasuryTreasury, U. SD. (2025, 01 16). Press releases treasury sanctions leader of Sudanese Armed Forces and weapons supplier. Retrieved from U.S. Department of the Treasury: <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2789">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2789</a></li>
<li style="text-align: left;">U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2025, 01 07). Treasury sanctions Sudanese paramilitary leader, weapons supplier, and related companies. Retrieved from U.S. Department of the Treasury: <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2772">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2772</a></li>
</ul>

آراء

Commentaries

حماية اجتماعية

Social Protection

الفقر

Poverty

الهجرة واللجوء

Refugees and Migration

السياسات الاقتصادية

Economic Policies

التنمية الشاملة

Inclusive Development

هل توقِف العقوباتُ الأمريكية الحرب في السودان؟

Can U.S. Sanctions Stop the War in Sudan?

Read Also